As 2025 drew to a close, the Council of Europe met for preliminary discussions on illegal migration, producing both a joint statement and a separate declaration by 27 countries, including the UK. Among the issues highlighted, one problem received insufficient attention: we need to improve the way we adapt to the changing nature of Channel crossings. While absolute numbers have dipped slightly since their 2022 peak, numbers remain high and unpredictable, and fatalities have increased notably (PDF). The core challenge today is not simply the volume of arrivals, but the rapidly evolving criminal ecosystems that facilitate them. Smuggling networks are adjusting faster than governmental policy tools, by shifting routes, exploiting digital platforms, and experimenting with new forms of coercion and revenue generation. Unless the UK and its European partners update their approach in 2026, they risk merely managing arrivals rather than disrupting the criminal systems that drive them.
At the EU level, addressing the nature of illegal immigration is certainly a priority, with Europol’s latest threat assessment (PDF) highlighting how digital tools are accelerating migrant smuggling. The situation is similar in the UK: according to the NCA, organised criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling increasingly rely on social media platforms, despite ongoing account takedowns and removals. In short, this is a dynamic environment in which criminal networks adapt quickly to enforcement and economic pressures.
Recent reporting suggests some organised criminal groups may now also be coercing migrants to carry small quantities of Class A drugs into the UK in exchange for cut price crossings. If accurate, this would signal an escalation that would pull those being smuggled directly into the drug trade, introducing serious risks for those involved and raising broader implications for border security and crime policy.
Both UNODC and Europol (PDF) have documented how migrant smuggling is becoming increasingly intertwined with other forms of organised crime, yet UK authorities have reportedly not yet identified drugs on small boat arrivals to date, suggesting that any such overlap is so far limited, or situational and opportunistic. The risk is plausible and serious, but remains poorly evidenced, underscoring the need for proportionate responses grounded in better research, data and safeguards.
To address this shortfall and remain in touch with similar emerging challenges, three priorities stand out. First, there is benefit in disrupting recruitment upstream, and improving understanding of how facilitators operate. Much of the organisation of people smuggling—and any “alternative payment schemes”—plays out online (PDF). In December, the UK government passed a new law to criminalise the creation of material published online that promotes or offers services that breach UK immigration law. Whether or not the legislation has an impact on migration and asylum pathways, in-depth analysis of publicly available social media can provide early insights, identify cross‑promotion with drug markets, and inform targeted takedowns and counter‑messaging that warns about health risks and coercion. These are not silver bullets, but they raise costs for criminal networks and support prevention.
Second, governments could better interrogate network structure and role shifts. Criminal networks are fluid. Migrants can be pulled—or in some cases coerced—into facilitation roles during transit or after arrival (for example, steering boats, acting as lookouts, arranging accommodation, or relaying contacts). The same networks may then leverage those individuals for other tasks, including low-level drug couriering or distribution. It is important to stress that many people in these roles may be victims of exploitation, debt-bondage, or intimidation (PDF) rather than willing participants. The evidence base on these role shifts is thin: case reporting is patchy, operational data are necessarily sensitive, and under-detection and selection bias are real. Understanding these dynamics role shifts is essential for designing effective interventions and disrupting criminal networks without further endangering vulnerable migrants.
Third, authorities could use structured foresight as a core capability that anticipates emerging threats and models how smuggling practices might evolve. This means establishing a dedicated horizon-scanning function that can bring together weak signals from open-source online activity, operational intelligence, frontline and NGO reporting, and financial data. Rapid, periodic evidence and intelligence reviews ensure that policy and operational responses can be adjusted at pace as the threat environment shifts.
The broader lesson is simple: as long as geopolitical factors and financial incentives encourage people to move, the demand for dangerous crossings will endure. Criminal networks will keep adapting, and so must the UK and its European partners. Whether the hints of overlap with drug markets prove to be isolated cases or the start of something more organised is still unclear, but it is precisely in these grey zones that complacency is most damaging.
What we need now is steadier ground around smart prevention, sharper intelligence, and a more nuanced understanding of how exploitation unfolds along the route. Above all, responses must protect people who are already vulnerable, not drive them further into the hands of the groups exploiting them.
An evidence-led, proportionate approach will not solve the Channel crossings on its own. But it can help stop policy from being driven by headlines or instinct, and support efforts to ensure that the UK is targeting the right risks, at the right time, in the right way.
– Dr. Shann Corbett and Dr. Dareen Toro are research leaders in the Defence, Security and Justice research group at RAND Europe. Published courtesy of RAND.
