Half a century after the establishment of relations between China and the EU, and against a backdrop of deteriorating transatlantic relations, the European Union and China held their 25th summit in Beijing. It is worth noting that the summit could not have been held elsewhere, as Chinese President Xi Jinping had refused an invitation to travel to Brussels.
Expectations were low, but the summit yielded more substantial results than expected, most likely due to the shadow cast by the current US administration and its bullish foreign policy.
Beyond the usual rhetoric about commitment to the relationship, respect for the principles of the United Nations and the rules-based international order, results revolved around three main axes: global challenges, trade relations and current geopolitical issues.
Global challenges
Both parties expressed a commitment to cooperation and joint leadership in the face of global challenges. This included environmental issues, which even warranted the publication of a joint press release, as well as a shared commitment to multilateralism in an international context that is particularly hostile to it.
With regard to the environment, both China and the EU have placed special emphasis on reducing emissions, as well as increasing financial contributions for this purpose and protecting biodiversity.
While this first area saw a notable degree of agreement between China and the EU, the same cannot be said for issues of trade and geopolitics.
Trade relations
President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, issued a strong warning about the need “rebalance” the EU-China trade relationship: “As our co-operation has deepened, so have imbalances”, she said. Specifically, she referred to the need to reduce the EU’s extremely high trade deficit with China, which reached €300 million in 2024.
In addition to existing tensions arising from the deficit, disagreements have recently emerged regarding the imposition of tariffs on certain products by each of the parties. These include levies imposed by the PRC on European pork and brandy, which are largely considered to be a retaliation against the EU’s decision to impose tariffs on imported Chinese electric vehicles in October 2024.
The EU, and the G7, have made efforts to reduce dependency on China, which Xi criticised directly: “Boosting competitiveness should not rely on building walls or barriers, as decoupling and severing supply chains will only result in self-isolation”, he said.
Despite tensions, there were also modest signs of progress – a tentative deal was struck to lift restrictions on Chinese exports of rare earth minerals to Europe, which had been in place since April 2025.
Geopolitical issues
Restrictions on Chinese exports of rare earth minerals to Europe and tariffs imposed on electric vehicles are actually closely linked to the third of the major issues addressed at this summit: geopolitics. This is an area where disagreement between China and the EU has angered the Chinese government – more so than trade matters.
However, unlike the United States, the EU has not opted for a policy of decoupling from Beijing, but rather for one of maintaining relations and derisking.
Indeed, the European Union, like the US, fears that China may use its growing technological capabilities to project influence, interfere in other states, launch cyberattacks or control systems. Electric vehicles could become a very useful tool for these purposes.
However, disagreements on international security between Europe and China do not end there. On the contrary, they have repeatedly clashed in recent years over the conflict in Ukraine, which von der Leyen described as the “determining factor” in EU-China relations.
Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU has viewed China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s actions with considerable displeasure. It has also criticised China’s ambivalence regarding the positions of Ukraine and Russia and, above all, the economic, political and military support provided by Beijing to the Russian Federation.
This already prompted action from the EU in early 2024, in the form of sanctions against Chinese companies for supplying Russia with components for the manufacture of weapons.
Unfortunately, the summit has not brought the two parties any closer to agreement on this issue. It therefore seems unlikely that European efforts to convince China to pressure Russia into agreeing to a ceasefire will bear fruit. The tensions make sense if we consider that this is where certain core differences between the EU and China converge – specifically their conflicting models of international relations, and longstanding views on human rights.
Limited results
Although the summit generated more results than many commentators expected, not all of them have been positive. Cooperation between the two powers has been rhetorically reinforced, but the meeting mainly served to once again underscore the enormous distance that separates Beijing from Brussels. For now, it seems that even the threat of the Trump administration’s foreign policy cannot bring them any closer.
Gracia Abad Quintanal, Profesora Agregada de Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Nebrija
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.
