In recent years, South Korea has cemented its ascendancy to the global top table as a defence-industrial player. In Europe, one country has been the primary foothold enabling South Korea’s rise: Poland. Cooperation between the countries is set to grow, with the parties finalising a $6.5 billion deal to supply K2 Black Panther tanks for the Polish military last month. But as South Korea seeks to extend its prominent position whilst European supply sovereignty concerns increase, what are the limits of this extraordinary relationship, and can it be replicated?
The answer, at least in part, is an age-old dilemma, but one that cuts to the heart of Europe’s defence-industrial challenges. In order to cultivate a ‘reference customer’ in the potentially lucrative and fast re-arming European market, South Korea has made wide-ranging concessions in the form of technology transfers which enable Polish industry to ‘do it themselves.’ To sustain its own position, South Korea cannot afford to replicate this at scale across Europe. For European rearmament, there are no clear-cut or easy solutions.
Seoul’s emergence as a global arms exporting power has been no accident. Through a focused industrial strategy approach paired with a strong domestic appetite for defence products as it continues its decades-long face-off with its hostile neighbour to the north, South Korea has efficiently and effectively positioned itself among the top 10 global defence exporters, taking a 2.2 percent global market share in 2024 according to SIPRI. Europe is a rich potential market, especially with the recent announcement that NATO allies will target spending 5 percent of their GDP on defence and security, but what stands out is that a staggering 46 percent of South Korea’s defence exports made their way to Poland in 2024.
Poland, in parallel, is rapidly modernising its military capability and has already proven that European nations can be lucrative partners for South Korean defence export ambitions, signing a landmark $13.7 billion deal in 2022—Seoul’s largest-ever arms deal, including K2 tanks, FA-50 jets, artillery and rocket launchers. This laid the groundwork for military-industrial collaboration between the two nations upon which the 2025 deal—which is for a further 180 K2 tanks—will expand. The relationship continues to flourish, signalling that Europe’s urgent defence modernisation needs could be met by nontraditional partners. Seoul’s relationship with Poland represents a potential model for future defence industrial, and perhaps strategic, cooperation with Europe.
For Poland, South Korean defence exports offer a number of advantages over traditional (i.e., U.S. or European) suppliers, or the prevailing trend towards investing in sovereign capability. Notwithstanding the economic factor—South Korean products offer a cost-effective alternative to most Western counterparts—the crucial factor in Poland’s procurement decisions has been speed, arguably at the cost of interoperability with NATO allies. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Poland has hugely increased its military spending to prepare for the Russian threat, increasing spending from 2.7 percent of GDP to 4.2 percent of GDP in a short space of time. Time and speed are of the essence for Poland, and Seoul has a track record of delivering defence capability for export quickly and at scale, in contrast to Europe’s slow ramp-up.
Nor has looking overseas to modernise its forces come at the expense of domestic industrialisation potential for Poland. To protect its own defence industrial base, Warsaw has ensured that technology transfer and local production licensing are part of the K2 deal. Of the 180 tanks to be produced, 116 K2GF variants will be built by South Korea’s Hyundai Rotem, while 61 of the 64 K2PL variants ordered will be manufactured in Poland by state-owned PGZ (Hyundai Rotem will produce the first 3 K2PL units). As part of this, the contract locks in the transfer of production, assembly, and MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) technologies for the K2PL to Poland. By securing these concessions, Poland has demonstrated that South Korean defence exports do not need to come at the cost of a sustainable domestic industrial base—in fact, they can enhance it.
For Seoul’s part, these concessions have enabled an export model that is leading to greater engagement and integration with NATO countries. National pride is a central pillar of this—it is a sign that South Korea has come of age as a defence industrial power, and that its global ambitions are indeed achievable. It is clear, then, that South Korea and Poland have managed to develop a mutually beneficial defence industrial relationship which meets the policy priorities of both governments. But what works for Poland is unlikely to make sense uniformly across Europe, and it is unlikely to be in South Korea’s interests to erode its competitive position by conceding so much of its hard-won technology. Other European partners should not expect the first-customer treatment that Warsaw has received.
South Korea’s leader missed the recent NATO Summit in The Hague, despite South Korean ambitions to integrate with like-minded partners through initiatives such as AUKUS Pillar II and closer NATO integration. Whilst South Korea’s existing foothold into Europe remains focused on industry, perhaps the success of Poland’s deals can act as a stepping stone to more direct strategic military cooperation. Through joint exercises, cross-regional defence initiatives, and expanding defence-industrial collaboration still further, South Korea and Poland—and Europe more generally—could kickstart a relationship that extends far beyond a purely economic partnership of convenience and unlocks the arsenal of democracy that Europe so urgently seeks.
– Stuart Dee is a research leader and Kiran Suman-Chauhan is a junior analyst in Defence, Security & Justice at RAND Europe. Dee is the codirector of RAND Europe’s Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition. Published courtesy of RAND.
