Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine pushed Polish decision makers to launch military modernization and expansion at a pace, scale, and direction that was unprecedented in Poland’s post-communist history. Given Russia’s planned reconstitution, the extent of military aid that Warsaw provided to Ukraine, and previous problems with modernization, Poland’s armed forces are at a crossroads. If Poland fails to realize its plans, it might come out of this moment relatively weakened and vulnerable. However, if Poland is successful, it will be able to take a much larger role in ensuring the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) eastern flank, thus providing the United States more flexibility to advance its interests in other parts of the world. In this RAND report, the authors outline Poland’s plans for modernization and expansion of the armed forces and provide a preliminary assessment of where U.S. support might be most useful to maximize the return on this joint U.S.-Polish investment in deterrence and defense.
Key Findings
- If modernization and expansion are successful, the Polish Armed Forces will be a top contributor to NATO’s land capabilities while still being able to provide meaningful contributions in the air and maritime domains. This plan is supported across Poland’s political spectrum. It is estimated that, in 2025, Poland will spend approximately 4.7 percent of its gross domestic product on national defense, a considerable share of which goes to the United States in arms contracts.
- However, expanding and modernizing the Polish Armed Forces will pose considerable challenges, particularly given the aggressive timelines for simultaneously expanding the military while fielding whole families of new vehicles and weapon systems.
- At the end of 2024, the Polish Armed Forces numbered 205,000 troops; it remains to be seen whether Poland’s accelerated recruitment efforts can generate an almost 50 percent increase in personnel to reach 300,000 by 2035.
- The government vastly increased defense spending, but many purchases are financed through direct loans from countries supplying equipment; if securing such loans proves impossible, market financing might be too expensive to turn framework agreements into binding contracts.
- Even if it is successful in rearmament and recruitment, Poland will require additional time and resources to build out wartime attritional reserves and munition stocks and further create the enablers necessary for the expanded force. In case of war, Poland might give its allies more time to fulfill their commitments but will not be able to stand alone.
Recommendations
- The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) should maintain and consider temporarily strengthening the U.S. military posture in Poland in the short- to middle-term to strengthen deterrence, thus ensuring that Poland has time to complete its modernization, and enhance interoperability and readiness. Doing so would maximize the return on already significant U.S. investment and signal to other European allies that taking a larger responsibility for regional security is highly appreciated by the United States.
- The United States should identify approaches to help accelerate Poland’s purchase of U.S.-built weapon systems, increase funding of direct loans, support training of newly equipped units, and offset potential limitations in key enablers.
- U.S. European Command (EUCOM) should continue to engage the Polish Ministry of National Defence to better understand the implications for deterrence and defense of this changing balance of power on NATO’s eastern flank.
- EUCOM and DoD should enhance dialogue with Polish counterparts to explore how this emerging force can be best used to support Poland’s and NATO’s strategic objectives and operational plans.
– Krystyna Marcinek, Scott Boston, Published courtesy of RAND.
