The Entrenchment of Iran’s Security State

 

The Entrenchment of Iran’s Security State
A demonstrator holds a picture of Iran’s new Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei at Enghelab Square in central Tehran on March 9, 2026, as supporters gather for a rally backing his appointment to replace his father after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in joint U.S. and Israeli strikes on February 28. (Photo by Arezoo / Middle East Images / AFP via Getty Images)

Washington is quickly learning it will take more than a sustained bombing campaign to topple the Iranian regime, if that indeed remains a goal in the Trump administration’s war on the country. The regime is showing remarkable resilience, as seen in the election of the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, but also in defiant statements from Iranian officials indicating their intractability. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, stated that Iran would keep fighting for as long as it takes, a sentiment that was reiterated in Mojtaba’s first official statement. Further, Ali Larijani, the Supreme National Security Council Secretary, directly threatened President Trump saying, “Watch out for yourself – lest you be eliminated” in what is perhaps the most brazen threat issued by an Iranian official since the outbreak of the war.

Iran’s regime hardliners and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) remain in power despite U.S. and Israeli strikes and Israel’s decapitation strategy to remove key leaders. The newly elected Supreme Leader, who is the son of the late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, only reinforces this control. Whether the new supreme leader survives the war may not matter much for the sustainment of the regime. In fact, Mojtaba’s death may only further entrench the IRGC and hardliner’s control. According to Reuters, U.S. intelligence believes the regime is not at risk of collapse and maintains control over the Iranian people. 

Three key factors explain why the regime has held on and why it is increasingly likely to survive the war. The IRGC is taking an even greater role in the domestic affairs of the state, ensuring the structure of the regime stays in place. Meanwhile, Iran’s opposition remains fractured without a credible leader capable of challenging hardline officials. And as U.S. commitment to the war begins to waver, the regime’s path to survival may be as simple as waiting out Washington.

The IRGC-backed Supreme Leader and Domestic Maneuvering 

On March 8, Mojtaba Khamenei was elected as the new Supreme Leader of Iran. Mojtaba has close ties to the IRGC and the IRGC reportedly engineered his election through forcing a quick vote and pressuring members of the Assembly of Experts, the body in charge of choosing the supreme leader. While not much is known about Mojtaba, in 2019 the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned him for acting as a representative of his father and furthering the former Supreme Leader’s efforts to destabilize the region and oppress the Iranian people. Notably, he had a hand in suppressing country-wide protests in 2009 surrounding the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Mojtaba’s close ties with the IRGC and previous involvement in violently quelling domestic unrest signals that he will continue his father’s legacy of oppression.

While Mojtaba’s appointment as Supreme Leader is important, the power dynamics behind his election are even more significant. Since the creation of the IRGC following the 1979 revolution, it has expanded into nearly every government institution. IRGC elites hold top political positions, and former members have claimed parliamentary seats. Under Ali Khamenei the IRGC grew its power and ability to influence domestic affairs with Iran’s theocratic security state ceding more control to the security apparatus.

In a telling example of who holds the power in Iran, a week into the war, President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized for Iran’s attacks on Gulf states, promising to end the attacks unless strikes against Iran originated from their countries. He was swiftly criticized by the IRGC and hardliners, causing him to walk back his apology. Despite being on the council to administer the country while a Supreme Leader was selected, Pezeshkian appears to have been reduced to a figurehead, making only occasional remarks on the war. Pezeshkian, who does not control the military, appears to be treading carefully to curry the favor of the new supreme leader who does have direct control over the IRGC. Of course, the Revolutionary Guards are not the only ones calling the shots, and the IRGC is far from monolithic, but military elites align ideologically with regime hardliners who are currently in power.

Beyond the internal political sphere, the IRGC exerts significant control over Iran’s economy and foreign policy. This is especially true given the country’s wartime status. The IRGC owns businesses across a variety of sectors with a large role in the oil and gas sectors. It is currently constricting oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz which is, above everything else, seemingly influencing Washington’s will to remain in the fight. This move is directly impacting Iran’s policies and shaping Iranian statements on the outcome of the war. 

Separately, the IRGC has played a key role in exporting the Iranian revolution, which can be seen through their network of proxies in the region. This forward defense strategy has taken a hit in recent years, but the IRGC is still able to leverage proxy networks to retaliate against Iran’s enemies.

Lack of Opposition Leader Capable of Challenging the Regime

The window for an opposition leader to rise and pose a credible challenge to hardliners in power is rapidly closing, if it is not already too late. Without a clear opposition leader, the regime will inevitably remain. Early in the war, President Trump stated that he had several candidates in mind, but that they died in the initial wave of attacks. Whether or not he will reveal any names or back someone else remains to be seen. 

Currently, the only opposition figure who has gained some notoriety is the former shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, although he does not have enough domestic clout to be able to successfully run the country. In recent weeks, he has expressed he would support shepherding the country through a period of transition but would not be the permanent leader of a new government.

If a democratic leaning Iran is to emerge in the near-term, a strong opposition leader will need to gain support soon and have enough backing from the Iranian people. Even if one arises, it will be an uphill battle given how tightly hardliners are controlling the government. Indeed, the country’s recent crackdown on political opposition figures, including arrests of several high profile reformists prior to war breaking out last month, illustrates how Iran’s hardline rulers are able to use repression to ensure no viable political contest is possible.

Further complicating matters, since the war began, security services have maintained an active presence on the streets in a show of force. Iranian security and intelligence services are arresting individuals accused of helping the United States, Israel, or supporting dissidents in a move that harkens back to previous security efforts to squash protest movements and tamp down any narratives that the regime is not explicitly directing. Protests have largely paused during the bombing campaign and Trump’s call for the IRGC to lay down their weapons will almost certainly continue to fall on deaf ears, hindering the progress of the protest movement. 

Wavering U.S. Commitment to the War

Outside of Iranian actors, the United States and Israel will also have a hand in determining what the next iteration of Iranian leadership looks like. Israeli officials have made it clear they will continue the war effort to reduce the threat from Iran. U.S. goals and commitment, however, are murkier. 

Rising oil prices, with Iran blocking the Strait of Hormuz, are no doubt influencing Washington’s outlook on the length of the war. Marking a shift in previous statements, President Trump recently indicated that the war was almost complete, soon to be over. No doubt rising oil prices are front and center in his mind and public statements appear to be calibrated to prevent further spooking the market. Of course, Trump could just as easily shift his recent stance, especially with Iran’s inflammatory rhetoric. 

With each day, however, it is becoming more likely that he will seek to find an easy out from the war, as some of his advisors are pressing him to do. President Trump may want a quick, clean victory, but there is no clean victory to be had in this war. In fact, making statements about ending the war soon, while the IRGC and hardliners are firmly in power, will likely only embolden the regime. 

The Iranian regime is patient and strategic. They are prepared to wait out Washington and craft the narrative around how they defeated the United States Statements from U.S. officials indicating flagging commitment to seeing the war through will be interpreted as a sign of weakness from Iran, causing them to continue to dig in. 

Regime Change Still Possible, But Unlikely

Regime change cannot be imposed through bombing campaigns alone, and even with more sustained military pressure a stable democratic outcome is far from guaranteed (take for example the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq). But whether the regime eventually falls or not, the United States needs clear goals and a clear exit plan. According to members of Congress briefed on U.S. war plans in Iran, U.S. goals and a defined exit strategy seem to be non-existent. The United States can’t accomplish its goals if it hasn’t defined what they are. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that engaging in the sustained effort required to meaningfully support the Iranian people is likely to be among them. 

, Published courtesy of Just Security. 

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