Today, the U.S. government confirmed and released evidence that North Korea (DPRK) is sending troops to Russia, backing South Korean and Ukrainian claims in recent weeks. Speaking in Italy after a trip to Ukraine, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin called this development a “very, very serious issue” and warned of impacts not only in Europe but in the Indo-Pacific as well. While the U.S. government is still uncertain of the role the North Korean troops will play, Austin suggested that this is an indication that Vladimir Putin “may be even in more trouble than most people realize.” Later this afternoon, the White House confirmed that North Korea has moved at least 3,000 soldiers into eastern Russia and promised to share intelligence, including satellite imagery, in the coming days that will show North Korean ships carrying troops going to Vladivostok, Russia, and other areas for training before potential deployment to the frontlines.
Q1: Secretary Austin called this a “very serious issue.” Why?
A1: The dispatch of North Korean troops to Russia for the war in Ukraine effectively shows that Kim Jong-un is “all in” in helping Putin win his unjust war. In addition to sending 8 million rounds of 122 millimeter (mm) and 152mm munitions and scores of ballistic missiles, North Korea is now providing the ultimate sign of an alliance commitment in the spirit of the renewed mutual defense treaty signed by the two leaders in June 20. It’s unclear whether these are technicians or combat troops. Either way, this makes DPRK the most visible and committed supporter of Russia’s aggression in Europe.
Q2: Why is Kim Jong-un doing this now?
A2: Several reasons. First, the Ukraine war is not only existential for Putin, it is also the case for Kim. North Korea’s support of Russia became evident at the outset of the war when it was one of five countries that opposed the UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 “Aggression against Ukraine.” For Kim, Putin’s war came at an opportune time as the North Korean leader was just emerging from a three-and-a-half-year Covid-19 lockdown and, before that, a spectacular failure in the country’s biggest diplomatic gambit in its 76-year history: the summit meetings with the United States. The war has given Kim much-needed supplies of food, fuel, and other materials stocked during the lockdown. Indeed, Pyongyang has put most of its chips in the Russian basket for now rather than China. Recent studies show the DPRK-China trade in 2024 has still not yet returned to pre-pandemic levels. While DPRK and Russia stopped reporting trade figures at the start of the war, CSIS imagery studies show large and unprecedented amounts of traffic along the rail connections between the two countries.
Second, DPRK support for Russia’s war allows the military to gain valuable experience with regard to the efficacy of its short-range ballistic missiles, as well as its munitions, although the latter is quite old and, in some cases, inoperative. Putting troops in the field will also give the 1.2 million-strong DPRK army with combat experience, which it has not had since the Korean War. In many cases, the DPRK military lacks the fuel and material for training. This shortage undeniably has been blessed by support from Russia, but the combat experience is invaluable. Kim will limit the number of troops he provides—some public reports say 10,000—given the military balance on the peninsula. This is unlike munitions, where Kim has provided millions of rounds that can be replenished through additional production or coproduction arrangements with Moscow.
Third, the tactical nature of the DPRK-Russia relationship means that Kim will seek to extract a high price from Putin for sending troops, which is the ultimate sign of alliance support. He will most likely press for not just more food and fuel but higher-end military technology, which the Soviet Union historically has been reluctant to provide. Kim has made no secret of this goal of building an intercontinental ballistic missile force capable of evading and overwhelming U.S. national missile defenses and building a nuclear submarine force, among other capabilities. These, in particular, are aimed at developing a survivable nuclear weapons force that could not be preempted by a U.S. first strike. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, in the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment, laid down a marker when she expressed the U.S. government’s concern that Russia may drop long-held nonproliferation norms. The dispatch of troops may be the threshold that leads Moscow to break those norms.
Q3: What does this mean for European and South Korean security?
A3: Though the number of troops committed by DPRK will be limited, North Korea has effectively crossed the Rubicon. Europe traditionally has been North Korea’s gateway to the West and was seen by Pyongyang as more “neutral” than the United States. North Korean diplomats are stationed in most European capitals, and the level of interaction in general (pre-pandemic) has been fluid, much more so than with the United States, South Korea (ROK), or Japan. But North Korea’s decision to send troops to kill Europeans will not easily be forgotten in European capitals. Thus, this tactical move by Kim will have long-term consequences for EU-DPRK relations.
South Korea has condemned North Korean actions, but it’s unclear how it will respond. What’s clear is that the Yoon government will feel compelled to up its commitments to Ukraine, whether this is in the form of more economic and humanitarian support or direct military assistance. Seoul cannot really afford to remain status quo in its support for Ukraine and NATO. There is an opportunity for the ROK and NATO to deepen relations pursuant to becoming a partner state in 2006 and advancement to the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme in 2023 in areas like intelligence sharing, cyberdefense, interoperability, emerging technologies, military purchases, defense-industrial cooperation, and establishing common standards.
Q4: What are the options going forward?
A4: We should not expect any UN Security Council action given Russia and China’s opposition. In the past four years, Russia has vetoed at least 13 United Nations Security Council Resolutions (not just on DPRK), and China has aided and abetted at least five of these. Actions and statements are more likely to come from the G7 countries plus South Korea, Australia, and other like-minded partners. This development will give impetus to the new grouping called the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team established by the United States, Japan, and South Korea last week to coordinate sanctions enforcement on North Korea.
Although China has been supportive of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the North Korean piece of the puzzle cannot be comforting in the least. For one, China does not like Russia to have so much influence over the North. In addition, if the longer-term ramifications of this cooperation lead to greater DPRK capabilities that invite even more U.S. military presence and allied capabilities in China’s region, that does not benefit China. Thus far, China’s reaction to North Korea’s support of Russia has been caught somewhere between paralysis and incompetence, lacking either the political will or policy ingenuity to create disincentives for either party. Specific actions that Beijing could take would include suppressing exports of petroleum coke (HS 2713) to North Korea, which could be used for munitions production. According to recent public reports, imports of this good (used for steel production) have dramatically increased while overall trade has only slowly started to return to normal.
Victor Cha is the president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
