This commentary was originally published by Foreign Policy on January 23, 2026.
If there is a single through line of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s foreign policy, it has been his hard-line stance on Iran. For decades, he has been warning of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of the ayatollahs. Understandably, he sees a regime whose refrain is “death to Israel” and that has a countdown clock to Israel’s destruction prominently displayed in the middle of Tehran as a threat to his country’s survival. Israel and Iran fought a shadow war for many years and, since the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre perpetrated by Iran-supported Hamas, three bouts of direct confrontation that culminated in a limited 12-day war last June. And the conflict shows no signs of being over.
But as occasionally happens in the Middle East, the unexpected transpired. As Iran faced widespread unrest spurred by high inflation and popular dissatisfaction with the regime, longtime Iran hawk Netanyahu backed off. Israel reportedly cut a deal with Iran for neither to attack the other and, together with Gulf states, helped talk U.S. President Donald Trump out of bombing Iran this time.
Netanyahu’s deal with Tehran, though, was more a tactical pause than a game-changer in the ongoing rivalry. The hiatus is unlikely to last long, and there are good reasons to believe that the next round of the Iran-Israel war will be even bigger than before.
Israel had good operational reasons for wanting to hold off on another direct confrontation now. During the 12-day war last summer, Iranian missiles killed at least 33 people in Israel, wounded more than 3,500, and caused at least $1.5 billion in damage. Israeli and U.S. air defenses kept those numbers from being a lot higher. By the end of the war, however, Israeli stockpiles of interceptors—particularly its advanced Arrow system, capable of intercepting ballistic missiles—reportedly began to run low. In addition, the United States now has fewer military assets in the region to assist Israel’s defense than it did last summer.
Israel also faces more immediate threats. Israel has long worried that Hezbollah, Iran’s premier proxy on Israel’s borders, could pull off a similar attack as Hamas did in northern Israel—but on an even grander scale. While the Israeli military killed some 4,000 Hezbollah operatives in its campaign in Lebanon in the fall of 2024, the group still retains tens of thousands of fighters. Israel continued to exert military pressure on the group even after a cease-fire went into effect in November 2024, and Iran still funneled some $1 billion to the group in 2025, according to U.S. officials.
Couple these practical factors with a general skepticism about whether airstrikes would have collapsed the Iranian regime during the protests, and it seems that Israel had other priorities before engaging in another bout with Iran.
Netanyahu’s calculus, however, may soon change again. Israeli Defense Ministry officials already promised to “significantly accelerate” Arrow interceptor production over the summer, and the military recently tested the new Arrow 4 air defense system. As for Israel’s northern front, the Lebanese government gave Hezbollah until the end of last year to disarm, as agreed to in the cease-fire, and began deploying its forces southward. Netanyahu’s office called these efforts an “encouraging beginning, but they are far from sufficient.” In other words, Israel will soon face a choice whether to let the disarming process play out or attempt to “finish the job” militarily itself.
Once either option plays out, Israel’s focus inevitably will turn back to Iran. While Israeli and U.S. air operations over the summer set the Iranian nuclear program back by several years or more, the Iranian regime has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions. A report by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, published late last year and which cited unnamed sources in Iran, said Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had privately given his approval to develop miniaturized nuclear warheads. And while an Institute for Science and International Security study concluded in late November that Iran’s primary nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan had been “largely destroyed and have seen little significant activity since the war,” other assessments noted a new nuclear site—dubbed Pickaxe Mountain—buried even deeper in the earth.
Iran’s nuclear efforts may also be enjoying the support of outside actors, most notably Russia. While Russia officially opposes nuclear proliferation, the Kremlin—which has relied on Iranian drone technology in its war in Ukraine—repeatedly reaffirmed Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, opposed Israel’s airstrikes in June, and left open the possibility of aiding Iran in any future confrontation with the West. Last September, the two countries signed a $25 billion deal for Russia’s state nuclear agency Rosatom to build four civilian nuclear reactors in Iran.
Iran is bolstering other military capabilities as well. Last fall, China reportedly shipped precursor ingredients for Iran’s ballistic missile program. In December, a media publication affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced ballistic missile tests, only for official state news to later deny the report. Also last month, an Iranian media outlet—citing unnamed military sources—claimed that Iran was working on chemical and biological warheads. Separately, Russia launched several Iranian communications satellites that reportedly serve civilian purposes, although some analysts suspect that they have a military function as well.
Israel is unlikely to let Iran’s military reconstitution go unchallenged. Even well before the June war, Netanyahu was skeptical that Iran would give up its nuclear program voluntarily, much less abandon its missile program and regional proxy groups. Now that Iran has shown itself willing and capable of directly attacking Israel with missile and drone barrages, Israel sees any potential nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons as even more of an existential threat. And in Israel’s post-Oct. 7 strategic mindset, preemption trumps deterrence as the preferred means to deal with such threats.
Adding to this dynamic is the fact that 2026 is an election year in Israel. Netanyahu has staked his political fortunes on guaranteeing security, particularly from Iran. Moreover, he will need to appease his hard-right coalition to govern. Already, several more hawkish members opposed the cease-fire that ended the June war and advocated for a more decisive end. Even if the Netanyahu government falls, it’s not clear that a more moderate Israeli government would take a softer line on Iran.
Israel has talked openly of another preemptive strike. In late December, Israeli army chief Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir warned that “Iran is the one that financed and armed the ring of strangulation around Israel and stood behind the plans for its destruction,” adding that Israel will strike back “wherever required, on near and distant fronts alike.” A few days later, Netanyahu floated the idea of another round of strikes during a visit to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate. Speaking after their meeting, Trump threatened to “knock the hell out of” Iran if it restarted its nuclear program.
If Israel is indeed considering another strike on Iran, then it may come sooner rather than later. The summer war stripped Iran of many of its air defenses and destroyed roughly half of surface-to-surface missile launchers. While Iran took to rebuilding its air defenses soon after the conclusion of the war, it still has not fully recovered from this loss. As former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani remarked in early December, “The skies over Iran have become completely safe for the enemy.” From an operational standpoint, Israel would likely prefer to strike while this window remains open.
This war also might be more extensive than last June’s campaign. Iran and Israel are separated by some 900 miles, which constrains military operations. But one can easily imagine a more protracted and destructive air war. After the 12-day war, Iran stopped reporting the locations of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, and some analysts worry that Iran can relatively easily transport the material around the country. Moreover, if Iran actually has a chemical and biological program, then the manufacture of these weapons does not require the same large, specialized infrastructure—such as centrifuge assemblies—that is needed for nuclear weapons, and they can be produced in a variety of locations. All that means that Israel’s targets will not be concentrated on just a handful of large nuclear sites.
Similarly, facilities buried deeper underground—such as Pickaxe Mountain—require more powerful explosives to target them effectively. Given that Israel possesses neither bombers nor the required ordnance, it would need the United States’ help to destroy the site, potentially broadening the conflict. If U.S. support is not forthcoming, Israel would need to strike the site repeatedly or conduct some sort of risky sabotage mission to destroy it. All of this points to a broader war than last June’s.
For its part, the IRGC argues that Israel won’t be able to sustain a longer and costlier campaign, suggesting it, too, would want a war to drag out. The prospect of another relatively quick, lopsided defeat not only would be a blow to Iran’s prestige but could further weaken the regime’s grasp on power. Still reeling from the largest anti-government protests in decades, the Iranian leadership cannot afford to look weak.
Of course, nothing in the Middle East is ever guaranteed. If the current protests in Iran reignite or even succeed in toppling the regime, it could shift Iranian foreign policy. On the Israeli side, growing war weariness may constrain politicians’ appetites for another clash. Trump may yet decide to bomb Iran, regardless of Netanyahu’s wishes—or, conversely, may launch a new push for a diplomatic settlement. There are other actors, too: China, which imports some 750,000 barrels a day of Iranian oil, would undoubtedly be worried about a war disrupting its energy supply.
Still, at present, the indicators suggest that Iran-Israel détente will not last long. And when it breaks down, the next round could be even bigger and uglier than the previous ones.
– Raphael S. Cohen is director of RAND Project AIR FORCE’s Strategy and Doctrine Program and the RAND School of Public Policy’s Master of National Security Program. Published courtesy of RAND.
