As the United States navigates a pivotal leadership transition, the Indo-Pacific region stands at the forefront of global strategic interests. The region is home to an uncertain mix of political disquiet, military peril, and economic potential, with issues like North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, China’s assertive territorial claims, and the delicate balance of power involving Taiwan shaping the narrative. All this makes the Indo-Pacific a crucial arena for U.S. foreign policy and the alliances and partnerships that will influence global trade and security frameworks moving forward.
We asked a team of RAND researchers with deep expertise on the various countries that make up the Indo-Pacific to assess the issues, objectives, and outlook for the region at this critical moment.
- Jeffrey Hornung highlights Japan’s focus on maintaining U.S. commitments amid regional security concerns.
- Miyeon Oh discusses the Korean Peninsula’s security challenges, balancing U.S. alliances with economic ties to China.
- Samuel Charap addresses Russia’s shifting priorities post–Ukraine conflict, emphasizing its ties with China.
- Raymond Kuo outlines Taiwan’s goals to enhance U.S. relations and defense capabilities.
- Jude Blanchette examines China’s strategic maneuvers and its hopes for an enduring “honeymoon” in U.S.-China relations.
Through objective research and expert analyses, RAND contributes to better understanding of the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical landscape, offering invaluable guidance during this critical period of U.S. leadership transition.
Japan
Jeffrey Hornung is the Japan Lead for the RAND National Security Research Division and a senior political scientist at RAND.
Issues
“The main priority for Tokyo likely will be to maintain U.S. commitments to Japan and ensure that Japan remains a vital part of U.S. strategy. Toward that end, I suspect officials will be reminding Washington often of the alignment of their strategic interests and the critical role Japan plays in supporting the United States both regionally and globally.”
Objectives
“The primary strategic objective of Japan for U.S. policy is to ensure Washington’s commitment to the peace and security of the region as well as to ensure that Washington recognizes Japan’s key role that it plays in that engagement. This includes keeping the U.S. presence in Japan. A key means to do that is to remind Washington of their mutual interests on China, North Korea, and Russia. One lingering, and often unspoken concern for Japan, however, is the possibility of Washington to cut deals with authoritarian leaders in North Korea or China that could ignore the interests of regional states. The biggest unknown, and arguably the biggest source of uncertainty for Tokyo, is whether Washington will demand any major changes in their defense ties.”
Outlook
“During the last Trump administration, Washington put a lot of pressure on Tokyo to increase its defense spending and money spent on hosting U.S. forces, something which the Biden administration did not do. Even though Tokyo has delivered on both and is spending at historic levels, many in Tokyo are bracing themselves for possible requests for further increases that may be difficult to meet.”
The main priority for Tokyo likely will be to maintain U.S. commitments to Japan and ensure that Japan remains a vital part of U.S. strategy.
The Korean Peninsula
Miyeon Oh is Distinguished Korea Policy Chair and a senior security and defense researcher at RAND.
Issues
“The security environment on and around the Peninsula is facing a series of structural changes, driven by multiple factors including enhanced nuclear threats from North Korea, its strong military ties with Russia, and the emerging informal alliance among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. If there’s a different approach toward the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by the Trump 2.0 administration, it would require a major policy change and redesign of South Korea’s national security strategy.”
Objectives
“Trade and economic measures, aligned with the bipartisan consensus on U.S.-China competition, are expected to continue in the areas such as semiconductor export controls under the Trump 2.0, along with expected major changes including imposing tariffs and possible revocation of U.S. government subsidies that Korean chip, battery, and electric vehicle makers were granted by the Biden administration. South Korea earned a record-high surplus of $55.7 billion in trade with the United States in 2024, which makes the country vulnerable in negotiating with President Trump, given his emphasis on the U.S. trade deficits.”
Outlook
“If the Trump administration wants to initiate negotiations with North Korea in year one, it will make it difficult for South Korea to be actively involved as a key player, given the current political crisis and leadership vacuum in Seoul. In designing a successful strategy to renegotiate with Kim Jong-un especially in the current security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula that is far more complex than that of his first term, however, it is crucial for the United States and South Korea to share the same goals and a policy road map through close coordination.”
Russia
Samuel Charap is Distinguished Chair in Russia and Eurasia Policy and a senior political scientist at RAND.
Issues
“Russia’s priorities in the Indo-Pacific have been transformed by its war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is looking to ensure that its relationships in Asia—now even more important because of the severing of its ties with the West—are maintained and deepened with its key partners, particularly China and India but also Vietnam, Pakistan, Indonesia, and others.”
Objectives
“For U.S. policy, mitigating the challenges posed by Russia’s close relationship with China will continue to be a priority. Additionally, Russia can complicate other U.S. regional goals quite capably on its own; North Korea is a recent case in point. Addressing those threats to U.S. interests will be an ongoing concern. Any possibility of stability let alone cooperation appears a long-term proposition at best.”
Outlook
“The United States faces a key question about what to do with its post-2022 surge in force posture in Europe that was taken in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. What it does in Europe could affect the availability of resources for Asia. In addition, the February 2026 expiration of the New START treaty—and the possibility of no replacement being in force before it expires—could directly affect China’s calculus in its own nuclear buildup. Even though Russia is a member of most Asia-Pacific regional organizations and a major military power in the region, the United States largely views it as a European challenge. But it will be important to remember that Russia has often demonstrated its ability to undermine U.S. initiatives in Asia.”
Taiwan
Raymond Kuo is director of the Taiwan Policy Initiative and senior political scientist at RAND.
Issues
“Taiwan has two key priorities for the United States during the second Trump administration. The first is enhancing the bilateral economic relationship. The United States and Taiwan have also been working towards agreements on taxes and trade. The second is bolstering Taiwan’s ability to defend itself against Chinese coercion. Taiwan is interested in acquiring further defensive equipment, but opposition parties have engaged in a constitutional and legislative hardball, the result of which has significantly cut into Taiwan’s defense budget.”
Objectives
“From Taiwan’s perspective, the top priority is shoring up U.S. support for Taiwan, particularly among skeptics within the administration. Preventing a U.S.-China deal (or in Beijing’s parlance, a “New Type of Great Power Relations”) that improves relations between Washington and Beijing without attention to the interests of Taiwan is a goal.”
Outlook
“I would expect Taiwan to further emphasize its importance to U.S. security and economic interests, particularly by increasing its integration into American supply chains and defense calculations. So, I wouldn’t expect breaks with the past so much as attempts to intensify the current relationship.”
From Taiwan’s perspective, the top priority is shoring up U.S. support for Taiwan, particularly among skeptics within the administration.
China
Jude Blanchette is the Distinguished Tang Chair in China Research, and the inaugural director of the RAND China Research Center.
Issues
“For now, Beijing is attempting to sustain momentum on the current “honeymoon” in U.S.-China relations, which was initiated by President Trump this summer with a series of comments that signaled he was looking to break with the highly competitive approach of the Biden administration. Yet the Chinese leadership no doubt remembers that the first Trump administration moved from an initially courteous tone to threats of tariffs and, eventually, the launching of a full-blown trade war in the summer of 2018.”
Objectives
“The Xi administration is communicating that while it doesn’t want a trade war with the United States, this time around it has developed a toolkit that it feels better positions it to inflict asymmetric pain on the U.S. economy. Instead of a tit-for-tat on tariffs, which characterized Beijing’s approach in 2018–19, they will now seek to put pressure on supply chain chokepoints, over which they have ample leverage.”
Outlook
“As Beijing watches with an anxious and uncertain optimism as the new Trump administration takes shape, Beijing will continue to push forward on its strategic objectives, with squeezing Taiwan’s diplomatic and strategic space remaining a top priority.”
