The shocking – though arguably not surprising – arrest of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s main rival, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, might have seemed in contradiction to Erdogan’s budding rapprochement with another longtime source of opposition, the Kurds. Yet İmamoğlu’s arrest only sharpens the contradictions at the heart of Erdoğan’s strategy.
In fact, the arrest fits squarely within Erdoğan’s longstanding governance playbook. He is once again using his hegemonic grip on State institutions to reshape the political field to his advantage. This move against İmamoğlu on March 19 would not have been possible without first sidelining or neutralizing the Kurdish political movement. Having reopened a negotiating channel with jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan, Erdoğan then created a calculated ethical dilemma for Turkish and Kurdish actors with İmamoğlu’s arrest – and likely with other anti-democratic moves that the president might pursue in his search for a way to gain a currently unconstitutional third term in office: Kurdish leaders now must choose between remaining silent and risking their moral legitimacy and electoral support among both Kurdish and non-Kurdish voters, or speaking out and risking a fracture in already fragile negotiations. Erdoğan is fully aware of this tension and is exploiting it.
A New ‘Peace’ Initiative
The seemingly promising prospect – at least at a surface level – of an accommodation between Erdoğan’s government and the country’s Kurdish minority began with a surprising turn last October. Devlet Bahçeli, an Erdoğan ally and leader of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a longtime opponent of peace efforts, called for a new process. He proposed that Öcalan address parliament to announce the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a striking break from the ruling bloc’s hegemonic stance.
The Erdoğan-Bahçeli alliance is both a product and a pillar of Turkey’s centralized presidential regime — emerging after the president’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its parliamentary majority in 2015, and solidifying in the aftermath of the 2016 coup against Erdoğan and through the 2017 constitutional referendum that granted the president unprecedented power. Anchored in the personal authority of two leaders rather than institutional party structures, the coalition is simultaneously strategic and fragile. Bahçeli exercises influence far beyond the MHP’s electoral weight, while Erdoğan relies on his backing to sustain majoritarian control. The regime’s concentration of power at the top renders such alliances indispensable — but inherently unstable.
Against this background, on Feb. 27 this year, Öcalan issued a landmark declaration calling for the disarmament and dissolution of the PKK, urging the group to formally lay down arms. In response, the PKK declared a ceasefire, pledging to halt armed actions unless attacked, while hoping Turkey would ease Öcalan’s prison conditions to let him oversee the process.
While this step offered hope for ending violence, the odds are low that it will be durable. Since 1993, peace efforts — including PKK ceasefires, back-channel talks, and a formal peace process — have failed due to spoilers, lack of transparency, and the State’s reluctance to address root causes. Without structural changes to the political order, this initiative is likely to collapse like previous efforts.
The Kurdish conflict is a protracted political struggle for recognition, rooted in systematic denial, structural inequalities, and historical grievances. At its core is the non-recognition of Kurdish identity, which Turkey’s nation-building project has long framed as a threat, prompting repressive State measures and assimilation to marginalize Kurdish political, social, and cultural existence.
This exclusion is not just a policy choice but is structurally embedded in successive political regimes, dominant ways of imagining national identity, and deep-rooted fears about national unity and stability. The dominant Turkish social contract — the implicit understanding of who belongs and on what terms, as imposed in the Turkish context through State institutions and nationalist discourse — has historically been built on the denial of Kurdish identity, framing its recognition as an existential threat. This perpetuates resistance to granting political rights and cultural freedoms.
Therefore, the conflict cannot be understood without examining power and exclusion, as political opportunities remain unequally distributed between Kurdish and Turkish identity groups. Such inequalities, evident in political party closures, mass arrests, and legal barriers, restrict non-violent Kurdish movements, leaving grievances unaddressed and fueling further resistance and repression.
A key example of these inequalities is the systematic appointment of trustees in Kurdish-majority municipalities. Since 2016, elected Kurdish mayors have been repeatedly removed and replaced with government-appointed officials, a pattern seen in three consecutive local elections. In 2016-2019, 94 out of 102 municipalities were placed under State control, followed by 52 out of 65 after 2019, and at least 10 more since March 2024.
The conflict also extends beyond Turkey, shaping — and shaped by — regional and international dynamics. Kurdish political movements in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, along with Turkey’s foreign policy and relations with the United States and the European Union, influence both State actions and Kurdish strategies. International pressures, regional power struggles, and shifting alliances continue to determine whether the conflict moves toward resolution or escalation.
The Context: A Calculated Shift in Political Strategy
The latest peace initiative emerged at a time when internal and external conditions forced Erdoğan to reassess his approach to the conflict with the Kurds. Domestically, he faces declining electoral support, having suffered his most significant defeat in more than two decades in the recent local elections, largely due to diminished Kurdish backing and worsening economic conditions.
His greatest challenge, however, is the constitutional barrier preventing him from seeking another term. His political future hinges on three scenarios:
- Calling an early election: The Constitution limits the president to two terms, but if parliament approves early elections with a three-fifths majority (360 out of 600 seats), he can run again.
- Changing the Constitution: Amending the two-term limit requires at least 360 parliamentary votes, which would trigger a referendum.
- Passing a constitutional amendment: Securing 400 votes would allow Erdoğan to remove term limits directly without a referendum.
None of these options are within Erdoğan’s reach currently, as his ruling coalition with the MHP lacks the majority to amend the Constitution or call early elections. In response, he has reverted to his familiar playbook of carrot-and-stick and divide-and-rule tactics — core elements of his strategy to manipulate the political landscape and maintain his dominance.
First, to bridge his parliamentary shortfall, Erdoğan has been strategically co-opting opposition lawmakers, gradually expanding AKP’s seats from 268 to 272 since May 2023. As of Feb. 26 this year, the People’s Alliance holds 324 seats, still 36 short of the 360 needed to trigger an early election. He is likely to continue this strategy gradually to avoid public backlash.
In this context, the talks with Öcalan serve a dual purpose: appealing to Kurdish voters while weakening the opposition, particularly İmamoğlu’s Republican People’s Party (CHP). By negotiating with Öcalan, Erdoğan aims to broaden his electoral base and limit opposition coalition-building, making it harder for rivals to unite against him. At the same time, this move pressures the CHP, forcing it to navigate peace efforts carefully without alienating nationalists or Kurdish voters.
Meanwhile, Erdoğan has intensified repression against the opposition, exemplified by the legal cases against İmamoğlu and now his arrest. Since taking office, İmamoğlu already had faced more than 90 administrative and judicial investigations, including criminal cases, allegations of misconduct, and even claims of diploma fraud, with multiple trials seeking prison sentences long enough to bar him from running for office.
This mirrors the fate of Selahattin Demirtaş, who, after leading his party to a historic victory in the 2015 elections, denied Erdoğan’s party a parliamentary majority for the first time. Seen as a political threat, he was imprisoned on politically motivated charges in 2016 and has remained in detention ever since.
External Considerations: Syria, Trump, and Global Power Plays
Regional and global dynamics further shape Turkey’s approach to the Kurdish conflict. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has long served as Washington’s primary counterterrorism partner against ISIS, significantly expanding its military and political influence in northeastern Syria.
But its growing autonomy has deepened tensions with key actors. Assad’s regime, backed by Iran and Russia, consistently opposed SDF autonomy, viewing it as a threat to Syria’s territorial integrity and central authority. Turkey likewise regarded the SDF as a proxy for the PKK and a long-term national security threat. Now, under the new Syrian regime, opposition to SDF self-rule continues. Turkey and Israel have gained a relatively stronger position in influencing Syrian affairs, while Iran and Russia have seen their influence wane following Assad’s ouster.
Meanwhile, Washington’s position on the SDF remains uncertain under the Trump administration. The extent of U.S. support over the long term now is unclear, especially as recent Pentagon plans indicate a potential drawdown of troops in Syria. Öcalan’s recent disarmament call adds further ambiguity — as it remains uncertain whether his appeal extends beyond the PKK to the SDF.
Against this backdrop, a major shift has occurred. The SDF has reached a preliminary agreement with the new Syrian regime of interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, laying out the basic terms and principles for future integration, with the United States likely playing a mediating role. While not a final settlement, this development could weaken Turkey’s justification for military intervention in Syria, which it has used repeatedly in recent years.
Globally, shifting power dynamics offer both advantages and challenges for Turkey. Trump’s evolving stance on Ukraine, rapprochement with Putin, NATO’s uncertain future, and trade wars all factor into Erdoğan’s strategic calculus. NATO’s fragility provides him with greater flexibility in pursuing defense and energy cooperation, while trade wars create openings for Turkey to attract investment and boost exports. As the U.S. reassesses its global military and economic role, Erdoğan seeks to re-position Turkey as a leading power, leveraging domestic stability to strengthen ties with Washington and Europe while expanding Turkey’s geopolitical influence.
Beyond security concerns, Erdoğan sees economic and strategic benefits in positioning Turkey as a stabilizing force. Amid financial instability, resolving the conflict could attract investment, boost trade, and reduce regional risks. He also seeks post-conflict reconstruction opportunities in Syria, Ukraine, and Gaza, making de-escalation essential to Turkey’s economic ambitions.
Opportunities, Limits, and Risks of the New Process
The Turkish government’s current peace process with the PKK presents a rare opportunity for peace, as both sides have suffered immense social, economic, and human costs, increasingly recognizing that political violence alone cannot bring resolution. With continued fighting proving too costly and a military victory unlikely, negotiations now seem like a more viable alternative. Yet while there are signs of renewed optimism, the process is also marked by deep contradictions and political risks that may undermine its credibility and long-term sustainability.
Unlike past efforts, this process has unexpected elite backing, particularly from Bahçeli, the MHP leader, which may reduce the risk of internal spoilers emerging — especially among hardline nationalist factions — and may broaden political legitimacy. Erdoğan’s strong grip on power is also an advantage. His centralized control over the State and security forces could allow for a more controlled and sustained peace process, minimizing internal opposition.
Additionally, both sides believe they have learned from past failures, gaining insight into what succeeded and what led to breakdowns. This experience provides a more informed foundation for renewed negotiations, potentially improving the prospects for a lasting resolution.
However, significant risks remain. The lack of a mediator is a major weakness, particularly given the power imbalance between the conflicting parties. Without a mediator, there is no mechanism to ensure both parties uphold their commitments, increasing the risk of deadlock or collapse. This asymmetry means that negotiations could be dominated by the stronger party, limiting meaningful concessions and undermining the legitimacy of the process — a concern heightened by the fact that Öcalan is negotiating under prison conditions, further restricting his agency and leverage.
Political spoilers pose another challenge. Despite Bahçeli’s backing, hardline nationalist and military factions could still sabotage the process, given Turkey’s deep-state tradition. Likewise, while the PKK maintains a strong command structure, some factions may reject disarmament, posing another risk. Meanwhile, external actors could exploit tensions, making spoilers a persistent threat to lasting peace.
The arrest of İmamoğlu reveals one of the most visible paradoxes of the process: while Erdoğan claims to seek a peaceful and democratic resolution to the Kurdish issue, he simultaneously silences one of his strongest opponents. This contradiction not only undermines the democratic legitimacy of the initiative but also hinders its societal ownership, making it harder for the peace process to gain broader public support.
Finally, it would be naïve to assume this process is driven purely by a genuine pursuit of peace. Erdoğan is a pragmatist and a Machiavellian strategist, for whom power is the ultimate currency. His commitment to negotiations is contingent on political gains, and if the process fails to serve his strategic interests, he is likely to abandon or reverse it, just as he did in 2015. Adding to the uncertainty is the fragile, leader-centric alliance between Erdoğan and Bahçeli, where internal rifts and power struggles are increasingly becoming visible, further raising the risk of derailment.
Against this background, the following section outlines a normative roadmap, grounded in widely accepted principles among scholars and peace practitioners, for what a legitimate, inclusive, and sustainable peace process would require in Turkey.
Beyond Elite Deals: Building a Peace That Endures
Decades of suffering and loss in the Kurdish conflict have intensified social antagonism between Kurdish and Turkish identities, reinforcing the perception of an irreconcilable divide. Therefore, ending this conflict requires both resolution and transformation. While conflict resolution seeks to end violence through negotiated settlements, conflict transformation addresses deeper structural inequalities and power dynamics to create a just and lasting peace. In many ways, the democratization of Turkey and the transformation of the Kurdish conflict are two sides of the same coin — neither can succeed without the other. While ending violence is a necessary step, the conflict is deeply rooted in systemic inequality, exclusion, and the denial of identity. Without addressing these structural issues, no peace can be truly lasting.
Therefore, a settlement confined to State actors and PKK leadership risks exclusion and instability. Genuine transformation requires the participation of civil society, political movements, youth organizations, and victims of the conflict, ensuring legitimacy and preventing a relapse into violence. Comparative peace processes show that inclusivity strengthens long-term stability and reduces the risk of renewed conflict.
A lasting peace requires acknowledging the political nature of the conflict rather than reducing it to a security issue. Without addressing historical injustices, political grievances, and the denial of fundamental rights, any settlement will remain fragile. Institutional structures that perpetuate political exclusion must be transformed to ensure equal democratic participation.
Beyond legal and political measures, a structured reconciliation process is essential to heal the past wounds. Mechanisms like truth commissions can acknowledge past injustices and foster justice and healing for both parties.
Finally, peace requires a shift in the national narrative. Sustainable peace cannot be built on policy reforms alone; it requires a transformation in the way society imagines itself– creating a shared and inclusive political vision for the future.
Conclusion: A Historic Opportunity or A Tactical Maneuver?
The possibility of PKK disarmament represents a historic opportunity for Turkey, yet it emerges within deep political paradoxes and fragile alliances. Erdoğan’s simultaneous pursuit of peace negotiations and authoritarian suppression of political rivals such as İmamoğlu underscores a fundamental contradiction that severely undermines the legitimacy of the initiative. Furthermore, the peace process remains vulnerable to the instability inherent in the personalized and increasingly fragile Erdoğan-Bahçeli coalition.
Without addressing the structural inequalities and identity-based exclusions at the root of the Kurdish conflict, the current negotiations — limited as they are to elite actors — risk collapsing under these tensions.
For Turkey to achieve lasting peace, it must move beyond short-term political gambits aimed solely at ending violence, towards comprehensive conflict transformation. Without such a shift, unresolved tensions will inevitably resurface, potentially in even more volatile forms.
– Recep Onursal, Published courtesy of Just Security.
