The military should take care of its core missions first.
Editor’s note: This essay is part of a series on the limitations, drawbacks, and dangers of domestic deployments, from Lawfare and Protect Democracy.
The primary function of the federal government, and in fact its only mandatory and exclusive charge, is to provide for the common defense. Today this means resourcing the military that protects the nation and its citizens and underpins America’s role as a global power.
What does this constitutional duty mean for determining what the military should be directed to do, and how it should be tasked to perform unplanned missions, particularly those assignments that may not require its specific skill set?
The stated mission of the Department of Defense is to “provide the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our nation’s security.”
The reality of the core function indicated by this short mission statement is the foundation for how the Defense Department is organized and trained. It represents what the department is expected to do—and what only it can do—such as building a Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, Space Force, and cyber proficiency capable of competing with China and others; sustaining and modernizing air, marine, ground, space, and special operations forces with power projection competence; and maintaining America’s nuclear capabilities.
Beyond this mission statement and the core functions it dictates, how the U.S. defines national security in many ways also determines how the military is employed.
The National Security Strategy puts forth such a ridiculously broad definition of national security that it includes pretty much anything and everything. Domestic issues are national security. Environmental issues are national security. Social issues are national security.
The federal government, including domestic departments and agencies, should focus on the nation’s security. In doing so, each entity should contribute through its assigned missions in homeland security, education, energy, the environment, and health. Those missions should not be assigned to the Pentagon.
For example, if the nation needs a workforce that has skills in engineering, advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and data analytics (and it does), the Department of Education should be laser focused on educating and producing such expertise.
The National Institutes of Health is charged with fundamental research to improve health and reduce illness and therefore has the lead for conducting basic and applied medical research on cancer and autism, among other things.
The Environmental Protection Agency has the specific mission, designated expertise, and accountability for environmental cleanup and restoration, climate change, and related research.
The Defense Department should not be duplicating these efforts. But the defense budget is loaded with programs and activities that do nothing to produce military capability and that duplicate the missions assigned to other departments and agencies.
When the definition of national security expands and blurs, and non-core programs are charged to the Defense Department, it can be difficult to keep in mind why discipline in the use of the military is important.
In light of the military’s immense capabilities—particularly in planning, logistics, and emergency response—there is an understandable tendency to turn to the armed forces to do things that go beyond its core function and purpose.
When a natural disaster strikes, domestically or internationally, the military is called upon to play a role in response. When the southwestern border is overrun with those seeking refuge from political persecution or economic hardship, or by criminals trafficking in drugs, people, and violence, the military—particularly through the National Guard—is called to support U.S. Customs and Border Protection in its mission. When domestic police forces are faced with protests that turn violent, the military may be called for backup. When people look for security, stability, and safety, they look to the military, as it represents these conditions.
Such expansion of the military mission brings consequences, financial and otherwise. This is particularly true for a military that is already underfunded to carry out the expectations of the National Defense Strategy, which is itself outdated.
Every time a new mission is assigned to the Defense Department, it must manage, plan, execute, assess, and report on the activity. This draws personnel, management focus, and resources away from what should be the defense core mission: preparing for, fighting, and winning America’s wars.
When a domestic crisis happens, the National Guard is often the first to be called. But when members of the National Guard are in uniform, they will be indistinguishable to most people from the active-duty military—which has consequences for civilian-military relations. When the military is asked to perform nonmilitary activities, the lines between military and civilian roles and responsibilities get blurred. This ambiguity of roles risks damaging the military’s historical and proper place in society. And, depending on why and how the Guard is called up and deployed, it uses some of the finite resources provided to the military.
And about money. The perception that the Pentagon has vast, flexible, disposable resources that can be diverted to other priorities that emerge is false and dangerous.
In this context, it is useful to understand the process employed to identify funding for new missions. This process highlights the trade-offs at play if resources are diverted from planned programs and activities and the potential consequences of decisions to direct the military to pursue non-core missions in the current threat environment.
Identifying Resources for Unbudgeted Requirements
When crises arise that may require military intervention and support, there is a rigorous, and typically long and difficult, process to identify sources within the budget to fund the new priority. Given the complexity of the Pentagon budget and the rules governing the hundreds of accounts used to manage and oversee its programs and activities, flexibility can be limited and most funding changes during execution require engagement with Congress. As a result, the military should not take on any new mission unless it serves a crucial priority that requires the specific capabilities of the military. Additionally, decisions to take on new missions should be made with a full understanding of the trade-offs involved.
The first thing the department does when a new, potentially costly requirement emerges is to compare what it thought it needed for its priorities when it submitted its budget to what is really happening when contracts are awarded. Circumstances change during the sometimes long time period between budgeting and execution.
For example, activities and items sometimes cost more or less than planned. When recruiting targets are not met and there are not as many people in uniform as expected, the cost of military personnel can be less than budgeted. Fuel costs can go up or down from when the budget is assembled. Contracts can award for less or more than quoted, depending on the final details of the contract. Programs can run ahead of or behind schedule. Technology advancements may present opportunities to do things better or differently and require resources to be tested and integrated. These fact-of-life changes may require moving money around and can also produce financial sources that are available for other priorities without impact to planned programs or activities.
But before this money can be used risk free for new missions, particularly any mission that does not specifically require the capabilities of the military, those missions have to be weighed against the known shortfalls in the budget that have generated a backlog of core-mission military requirements that are unfunded.
If sources from fact-of-life changes are not available, the department would start looking for ways to delay planned programs or incrementally fund requirements, both of which increase costs and result in future risk and additional resource requirements.
Existing Funding Shortfalls and Backlogs
The Defense Department is still recovering from the many readiness and modernization challenges that emerged during the Budget Control Act and sequestration funding reductions implemented more than a decade ago. It has also experienced historically low budgets as a percentage of gross domestic product, which is particularly concerning considering the multiple ongoing missions in many regions and the growing capabilities of the adversaries the nation faces. When combined with modernization requirements, including the nuclear triad, and increasing costs of maintaining the current force and equipment, the department has a long list of items and systems it needs to buy and bills it needs to pay that are waiting for resources to become available.
The department’s needs related to investment and modernization—particularly with respect to shipbuilding, readiness and training, and facilities maintenance backlogs—shed light on the existing budget shortfalls and their importance to the nation’s security.
Investment and Modernization
Pentagon investments accounts include, among other things, money for buying equipment, construction of facilities and training ranges, and all the research and development that goes into developing new technologies and integrating them into weapons systems consistently. Shortfalls in these accounts make up about 80 percent of unfunded priorities listed by the nation’s most senior military officers. In the past three years alone, Defense Department leaders have listed a funding gap of more than $27 billion just for the accounts used to buy more and more modern ships, aircraft, ground vehicles, munitions, communications equipment, and satellites. Shortfalls in these accounts harm the entire defense industrial base and the supply chain—in which vulnerabilities have been increasing over the past several decades.
Of particular relevance to the security threat environment detailed below, large portions of the unfunded lists are for capabilities needed in the Indo-Pacific region. Also of note, the National Guard has reported equipment shortfalls that would jeopardize its ability to train and respond when needed, whether that response is for domestic or international operations.
Military requirements in the procurement category that are waiting in line for funding include submarines, missiles, National Guard 4th- and 5th- generation fighter aircraft, amphibious combat vehicles and helicopters for the Marine Corps, and the vast array of increasingly applicable unmanned systems.
Shipbuilding and Procurement
America has a broad challenge in producing and maintaining the ships it needs for its economic viability and security. Navy ship procurement has declined from 23 ships in 1986 to just six planned for next year, with a current fleet that is well below the Navy’s target. (The shipbuilding target is itself uncertain given the inability of the Navy to put forth a single, feasible shipbuilding plan.) Regardless of the target and the varied plans offered, the Navy is not projected to reach the requirement for decades. Industrial and workforce capability to build ships is only part of the problem. The nation’s shipyards and dry docks are also struggling to maintain the current fleet so that it can be kept at sea, as the costs to support ship operations increase.
This is especially worrisome in the context of the advances of China’s Navy. The Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy, referencing information from the Office of Naval Intelligence, notes that China has become the world’s top shipbuilding and shipping nation with 230 times more shipbuilding capacity than the United States.
The shipbuilding crisis is dire enough that Congress included $3.3 billion in the supplemental appropriations bill earlier this year just to develop submarine infrastructure, including investments in dry dock construction. The shortfalls in this crucial element of U.S. military power should not be overlooked when prioritizing missions that do not require participation of U.S forces. But there are others.
Readiness and Training
Defense shortfalls in the perishable areas of readiness and training undermine the ability of U.S. forces to respond when called. And deficiencies in readiness and training can all too often result in loss of life. In 2023 alone, 33 uniformed personnel were lost during training operations.
Shortfalls in operations and maintenance accounts—which fund readiness and training activities—are frequently included in the annual unfunded priorities lists submitted by the nation’s military leadership. In the past three years, $14 billion in shortfalls were listed for these activities. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2022 that the Navy’s ship maintenance backlog had grown to nearly $1.8 billion. Maintenance and supply issues also limit the availability of aging aircraft. The Air Force notes a $1.5 billion shortfall in the coming year for parts to keep its force ready and safe for operations.
Another serious and growing backlog exists in facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization (FSRM) due to chronic underfunding. These requirements are often bill payers during budget crunches as they are relatively easy to skim and the consequences, though costly, are not necessarily immediately visible. The GAO estimated the backlog in 2020 to be at least $137 billion for these efforts. Such chronic shortfalls lead to costlier maintenance on facilities once funds do become available and to poor living conditions for uniformed personnel and military families.
For example, numerous reports and audits note sewage overflows, “inoperable fire systems, broken windows, bug infestations, cold showers, lack of heat or cooling, and mold” as just some of the problems facing uniformed personnel and their families. The Pentagon is trying to improve facilities, but the lack of sufficient, consistent, on-time funding for such a fundamental and fixable need damages the readiness of the force and thereby harms America’s security.
All of these needs that support the military’s core function must be contemplated when making any decision to divert resources to other missions. But perhaps more important than any particular spending priority is the need to allocate resources consistent with the holistic threat environment.
Threats
Two recent independent commissions have characterized the national security environment America now faces and, thereby, the capabilities and resources the military needs.
First, according to a recent assessment of the National Defense Strategy by a bipartisan commission of experts, “The threats the United States faces are the most serious and most challenging the nation has encountered since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war.” The commission finds that “in many ways, China is outpacing the United States and has largely negated the U.S. military advantage in the Western Pacific through two decades of focused military investment.”
Affirming the point made above about shortfalls in the current military force, particularly in readiness and training, the commission states: “[T]oday’s is the smallest force in generations. It is stressed to maintain readiness today and is not sufficient to meet the needs of strategic global competition and multitheater war.”
Interestingly, the commission also notes that “[t]he U.S. public are largely unaware of the dangers the United States faces or the costs (financial and otherwise) required to adequately prepare. … They have not internalized the costs of the United States losing its position as a world superpower.” This insight is particularly relevant in considering the trade-offs that could be required if the nation wants to use the military for missions that could, and should, be performed by other elements of the federal government.
Finally, the commission points to another well-known but not yet resolved threat that underpins the resilience and responsiveness of the military—the defense industrial base, which the commission finds is “unable to meet the equipment, technology, and munitions needs of the United States and its allies and partners.”
To address existing resource shortfalls, the commission recommends that Congress immediately provide supplemental funding for a multiyear investment in the national security and innovation industrial bases with a particular focus on shipbuilding and munitions as mentioned above.
The second characterization of the threat comes from the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, which made complementary observations regarding the current strategic environment. The commission’s final report states: “Today the United States is on the cusp of having not one, but two nuclear peer adversaries, each with ambitions to change the international status quo, by force, if necessary: a situation which the United States did not anticipate and for which it is not prepared.”
The needed updates to the current National Defense Strategy, which describes the force structure and military capabilities the nation needs, will also add to the budget challenges described here.
On this subject, the Strategic Posture Commission concludes that
America’s defense strategy and strategic posture must change in order to properly defend its vital interests and improve strategic stability with China and Russia. Decisions need to be made now in order for the nation to be prepared to address the threats from these two nuclear-armed adversaries arising during the 2027-2035 timeframe.
Conclusion
Many interrelated factors should be carefully examined when considering the use of the military. The defense mission and core capabilities developed to carry it out often do not correspond to the skills needed to perform domestic tasks. Serious and likely harmful consequences flow from diverting the armed forces and the resources that support them to missions more appropriately tasked to domestic agencies. Those consequences include distracting the military from its main function—deterring and if necessary fighting America’s wars—and blurring the lines between what civilians are trained and resourced to do and what is expected from a professional military.
Given the nation’s vital role as a global power and the current strategic environment that demands a focused, ready, and modern military, policymakers should think carefully about priorities, capabilities, risks, and trade-offs when assigning missions to the Defense Department and to other federal departments and agencies that also have specific roles and responsibilities for domestic assignments.
– Elaine McCusker is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she focuses on defense strategy, budget, and innovation; the US military; and national security. Before joining AEI, McCusker served as deputy and then acting under secretary of defense (comptroller) from August 2017 until June 2020. Published courtesy of Lawfare.
