mproved ties between the United States and its great-power rivals, Russia and China, appear to be imminent. The Trump administration is negotiating directly with the Kremlin in an attempt to end the Russia-Ukraine war, U.S. President Donald Trump may meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the two could perhaps reset the entire bilateral relationship.
Similarly, Trump has said that he would like to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, possibly in the United States, to resume negotiations on areas of high friction—namely, the substantial trade imbalance. Trump has also said in recent weeks that he has a “great relationship” with Xi and looks forward to “getting along with China.”
The world is still grappling with and adjusting to this potential geopolitical shift. In the Indo-Pacific, responses are likely to be mixed. U.S. allies and close partners may voice deep concerns, but the vast majority of countries will probably convey cautious optimism that nuclear-armed rivals are on speaking terms and trying to peacefully work out their differences. This is particularly true for those Indo-Pacific nations perpetually worried about being stuck in the middle.
At the same time, however, these nonaligned countries of the Global South may worry that the prospects for their hedging strategies—whereby they reap benefits from playing the great powers off each other—could significantly diminish.
The United States’ allies in northeast Asia—Japan and South Korea—will likely express deep reservations about what appears to be the new U.S. strategy. Since the outset of the Russia-Ukraine war, Tokyo has strongly supported the Biden administration’s position by signing onto and enforcing U.S.-led sanctions against Moscow.
Japan has also been worried about the “no limits” strategic partnership between Russia and China, which could become a force multiplier in future Indo-Pacific conflicts, whether over the Kuril Islands, the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China), Taiwan, South Korea, or the South China Sea. Tokyo was unnerved in November, for example, when China and Russia deployed strategic bombers in a joint air patrol over the Sea of Japan.
Nonaligned countries of the Global South may worry that the prospects for their hedging strategies—whereby they reap benefits from playing the great powers off each other—could significantly diminish.
But Japan is primarily concerned that a refreshed U.S.-China relationship will embolden Beijing to seize disputed islands, such as the Senkakus, or attack Taiwan, which might require Japanese intervention to ensure the security of the Ryukyu Islands—Japanese territory with a westernmost island located just 68 miles from the coast of Taiwan.
South Korea is almost exclusively focused on the threat from North Korea and could face enormous strategic consequences if Washington improved ties with Beijing, Moscow, or both. Were Washington to prioritize coordination with these two rather than Seoul, the latter might lose significant leverage when dealing with the North Korean regime.
The United States could also look the other way on North Korean military assistance to Russia in Ukraine, enabling Pyongyang to further battle-harden its troops for a potential war on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, neither Beijing nor Moscow would feel as much pressure to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea, which might even get United Nations sanctions relief with U.S. consent.
The Asian country that perhaps has the most to lose would be Taiwan. As a long-standing strategic partner, Taipei has always hoped—and possibly expected—that Washington would intervene militarily if Beijing ever attacked the island.
Indeed, U.S. President Joe Biden publicly noted on four separate occasions that the U.S. military would assist Taipei in such a scenario, effectively moving Washington away from its position of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity.
But if U.S.-China ties were to improve, then Taiwan would wonder whether Biden’s commitments still hold. And of course, any U.S. accommodation with the Kremlin on Ukraine that sees Russia retaining conquered territory will surely create panic in Taiwan over Washington’s interest in its security and continued sovereignty.
In Southeast Asia, the reaction to any U.S. detente with China and Russia would probably be overwhelmingly positive, as nearly all of these states seek to avoid becoming ensnared in great-power competition and possibly war in their region. The United States’ key strategic partners—Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam—already maintain strictly nonaligned foreign policies that eschew choosing one great power over another. To the contrary, their strategy has been one of hedging with the great powers to protect themselves.
Vietnam, for example, is the only country in the world since Russia invaded Ukraine to have welcomed Biden, Xi, and Putin for summits. Other countries in the region, such as Brunei and Malaysia, would similarly welcome a shift. Cambodia and Laos are already entrenched in China’s strategic orbit and may expect even greater benefits if Washington and Beijing get along. The junta in Myanmar, which is fighting an ongoing civil war, maintains close security ties to both China and Russia, so a U.S. strategy shift would likely be embraced there as well. Even Thailand, a U.S. treaty ally, would likely endorse better U.S.-China ties, because Bangkok does not share Washington’s urgency to address the China threat.
Of all Southeast Asian countries, only the Philippines—another U.S. security ally—would surely lose from a major shift in U.S. strategy toward China and Russia. For decades, Manila has been forced to confront Beijing’s encroachments into its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, most notably in the Spratly Islands and at Scarborough Shoal.
Beijing’s blatant disregard for international law and norms has resulted in many dangerous incidents at sea involving gray-zone tactics by Chinese coast guard vessels and a militarized fishing fleet. This has especially been the case when Manila periodically attempts to resupply its troops on the World War II-era Sierra Madre tank landing ship at Second Thomas Shoal. In response, the United States and Philippines have taken many steps to strengthen their alliance to enhance deterrence—for example, by expanding the number of Philippine bases that the U.S. military can deploy to from five to nine. If Washington and Beijing were to have a closer relationship, then Manila would naturally worry about the ramifications for the alliance.
Meanwhile, in South Asia, another key U.S. strategic partner—India—would surely embrace better U.S.-Russia ties, although it might fret over closer U.S.-China relations. One of the few constant frictions in U.S.-India ties, particularly since the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine, has been the doggedness of the India-Russia strategic partnership, including new security arrangements signed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Putin in Moscow last year. A better U.S.-Russia relationship would make that source of friction go away.
On China, India is much more wary. In October, New Delhi and Beijing peacefully resolved their land border standoff and began the process of de-escalating ties. But the heavy emphasis on defense cooperation during Modi’s visit to the White House in mid-February strongly suggests that India sees the United States as the primary power to help it balance against China. Hence, closer U.S. ties to China will be viewed with suspicion in New Delhi.
All other South Asian countries—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—are very likely to enthusiastically applaud improved great-power relations. As in Southeast Asia, they are simply looking for a more peaceful and stable environment for socioeconomic development.
Of those countries, however, Bangladesh and Pakistan might be happier than the rest. Bangladesh, whose ties with India are under strain since a political transition in Dhaka last August, has in recent months increasingly turned to China for support—and less so, Russia. For decades, Pakistan has maintained an “iron brotherhood” with China, and in recent years it has sought to leverage Russian assistance as well, particularly to build a gas pipeline from Karachi to Lahore as well as to engage in joint military exercises and counterterrorism cooperation.
In Oceania, the Solomon Islands demonstrates the possible loss of bargaining leverage if the great powers suddenly get along better. Before signing a security agreement with China in 2022, the Solomon Islands enjoyed being the center of attention as the United States and its friends rushed to dissuade it from proceeding with the deal. In the end, Washington would not or could not offer anything better than Beijing, so the Solomon Islands went forward with the deal.
It is precisely these types of opportunities that smaller and middle-sized countries all across the Indo-Pacific will miss out on if there is a U.S. shift in the future. Overall in Oceania, however, improved U.S. ties to China and Russia would generally be welcomed, as small Pacific island countries have become increasingly wary of intensifying great-power competition.
Overall in Oceania, improved U.S. ties to China and Russia would generally be welcomed, as small Pacific island countries have become increasingly wary of intensifying great-power competition.
The exceptions are, of course, Australia and New Zealand—a U.S. security ally and close partner, respectively. In recent years, Canberra has identified Beijing as its top geostrategic threat and bolstered its alliance with Washington, not least by deepening its engagement through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and by signing the Australia-U.K.-U.S. security pact.
New Zealand’s worries, too, are growing. Last month, for instance, the Cook Islands—a sovereign nation that is supposed to consult with Wellington on security matters, according to a long-standing free association agreement—decided without consultation to ink a new deal with China to enhance the latter’s maritime presence on the islands. Chinese warships also recently conducted a live-fire exercise in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand, heightening fears that Beijing sees a forward presence in Oceania as a strategic necessity.
Mongolia and North Korea are likely to both oppose and undermine U.S.-Russia or U.S.-China detente, but for opposite reasons. For Mongolia, which is geographically squeezed between Russia and China and constantly hedging with both to ensure its survival, the United States has always been a very useful “third neighbor” to balance the two. Without Washington, Ulaanbaatar would lose critical leverage. North Korea has the same problem but in reverse: It needs China and Russia to resist the United States, but a friendlier great-power dynamic could seriously jeopardize this strategy.
It is still early days in the Trump administration’s approach to what have long been the United States’ main adversaries. Indeed, a shift may not materialize at all. But assuming it does, much of the Indo-Pacific—with the exception of close U.S. allies and partners—is likely to be broadly optimistic that their part of the world becomes more stable.
– Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at RAND, an adjunct professor at the University of Southern California, and a former daily intelligence briefer to the U.S. assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs. Published courtesy of RAND.
