Last week’s Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program and military assets and Iran’s responding missile strikes represent a significant escalation in the long-standing tensions between the two nations. While covert operations and proxy conflicts have defined much of their rivalry in recent years, this overt military strike signals a dramatic shift in the nature of their confrontation. The attack raises urgent questions about the motivations behind Israel’s actions, Iranian retaliation, and the broader implications for regional and global stability.
To explore these issues, RAND experts provide insights into the strategic, diplomatic, and economic dimensions of this unfolding crisis. From the risks of further escalation to the impact on U.S. foreign policy and global energy markets, their analysis sheds light on the complexities of this pivotal moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
This violence marks a dramatic departure from the long-simmering Iran-Israel shadow war. Why is it happening now?
Heather Williams Israel is trying to take advantage of its successes against Hezbollah and Hamas and the fall of Assad in Syria to deal a serious blow to Iran. More than simply setting back Iran’s nuclear program, Israel appears committed to punitive damage that causes permanent harm to the Islamic Regime’s military capabilities and political resolve.
Raphael S. Cohen Simply put, Israel believed it was almost out of time to stop an Iranian bomb and that the time was right for a preventative strike. In a post–October 7th world, Israel believes that an Iranian bomb poses an existential risk to Israeli security. Thanks to war in Gaza and Lebanon, Israel has dealt significant blows to Iran’s proxy network, particularly Hezbollah. Moreover, back in October, Israel had already taken out some of Iran’s air defense.
Karen M. Sudkamp Since Hamas’s October 2023 attack, Israel has been less restrained in conducting military operations against its adversaries. Operations in Gaza, operations against Lebanese Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis, and expanding Israeli influence in Syria, coupled with assassinations of Iranian military officials responsible for covert activities, illustrate Tel Aviv’s emboldened approach. Unconventional attacks from these actors, supported through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, historically were the strongest Iranian response options.
Michelle Grisé With dimming prospects for a U.S.-negotiated nuclear deal with Iran, Israeli decisionmakers may have perceived a closing window of opportunity and viewed military action against Iran as the only viable option on the table for preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear-weapons capability.
Marzia Giambertoni The escalation represents the convergence of several factors: Iran’s nuclear program reaching dangerous thresholds (60 percent uranium enrichment), Israel’s assessment that diplomatic options were exhausted, and the strategic window created by Hezbollah’s weakened state following the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah. Israel’s decision to strike directly rather than through proxies signals a fundamental shift from shadow warfare to overt confrontation.
What potential avenues for response remain open to Iran?
Williams Both sides can continue missile strikes that destroy infrastructure and cause casualties, but this stage of the conflict is likely to last only days to weeks. The greater potential risk for regional conflict is that these attacks harden Iranian resolve to develop nuclear weapons, and could lead to a nuclearized Middle East.
Cohen Iran has a couple options still open to it. While its proxies have been badly damaged, Iran still can leverage these groups to some extent. More importantly, Iran has a vast arsenal of thousands of missiles that can range Israel. Lastly, Iran also has asymmetric tools at its disposal—cyber, sabotage, terrorism, and the like.
Sudkamp Since strikes began, it is increasingly likely that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the defense establishment consider the Israeli strikes an existential threat to regime survival. Tehran’s conventional response to Israeli military targeting has been restrained and inflicted limited damage. However, with an existential-threat consideration, Tehran will likely implement less constrained responses, especially the longer strikes continue.
Grisé The scale and scope of strikes in the current crisis represent a significant escalation, as evidenced by the mounting civilian casualties in both countries, and Iran is likely to continue to intensify its military response in the coming days and weeks rather than seeking a diplomatic off-ramp.
Giambertoni Iran’s immediate response demonstrates its conventional missile capabilities, but its broader strategy will likely emphasize proxy activation. The involvement of Houthi forces already signals this approach. Escalation risks remain high given ideological commitments on both sides and limited off-ramps for face-saving de-escalation.
What should the United States do to protect its military personnel and assets in the region? How might Washington navigate a widening Middle East conflict while managing strategic competition with China and Russia?
Williams The threat to U.S. personnel in the region is real. In terms of broader conflict in the Middle East, Israeli military successes against Iran are likely to reduce the threat in the short term and raise it in the long term. On the one hand, this could give Washington space to focus on more-immediate security needs in other theaters, but it also could set conditions for a future Middle East conflict that would mire the United States when it wants to be focused elsewhere.
Cohen From a competition-with-Russia-and-China perspective, the best option for the United States is to let Israel continue its attacks on Iran. After all, Iran is an ally of Russia and increasingly aligned with China, so weakening Iran de facto harms the interests of the other two powers.
Sudkamp The United States evacuated nonessential personnel prior to Israel’s strike from Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates—countries that could receive initial attacks against U.S. personnel should Tehran choose to include American targets in its response. U.S. naval assets are also moving towards the Middle East as defensive forces.
Grisé Over the weekend, both China and Russia have sought to portray themselves as potential power brokers who can play a constructive role in mediating the unfolding conflict. This underscores that navigating tensions in the Middle East is part and parcel of broader U.S. efforts to effectively manage its strategic competition with China and Russia.
How might this incident affect U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East?
Williams The United States is generally reactive when it comes to Iran, and Iran’s response could create certain imperatives for U.S. foreign policy. Israel’s initiatives against Hezbollah and Iran have created an opportunity for lasting advantage against the so-called Axis of Resistance, and it would be in the U.S. interest to try to translate operational gains into long-term strategic successes.
Cohen The United States is not—and should not be—an impartial observer here. Even bracketing the U.S. historical support for Israel for a moment, this Iranian regime has been actively killing Americans for decades. That should be reason enough why the United States should not want this Iranian regime to have nuclear weapons, nor should it be particularly upset to see Iranian military capabilities degraded.
Grisé Washington will have to balance competing priorities—preventing Tehran from sprinting toward a nuclear-weapons capability while keeping the United States out of another conflict in the Middle East. This crisis underscores a persistent difficulty in U.S. foreign policy over the last two decades: Security imperatives in the Middle East demand attention even though Washington may want to reorient resources toward other theaters.
What are the regional consequences of this attack?
Cohen The attack could remake the chessboard of the Middle East. If Israel is successful at neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program and if that in turn destabilizes the Iranian regime, it could shift the balance of power in the region. But as the United States has learned, regime change in the Middle East is a particularly fraught business, so there is no guarantee of a positive outcome.
Giambertoni The inability of Iran’s weakened proxies to deter Israeli action exposes strategic vulnerabilities. Iran may accelerate efforts to rebuild proxy capabilities. However, direct conventional exchange may signal Iran’s recognition that proxy warfare alone cannot address existential threats to core national interests, potentially reshaping the regional security architecture.
If Israel succeeds in neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program and if that destabilizes the Iranian regime, it could shift the regional balance of power
What are the possible economic implications?
Howard J. Shatz Oil prices jumped with the start of Israel’s action against Iran, suggesting that oil markets see increased risk, but it is too soon to reach a concrete judgment on global economic consequences. There will be two specific factors to watch to make a better judgment as to global economic consequences: first, whether Iran attacks Gulf Arab oil infrastructure, and second, whether passage through the Strait of Hormuz is blocked. If either or both happen, energy prices are likely to rise much further, raising the risk of a global recession. If neither happens, there will be heightened risk, but more modest energy price increases to which the world can probably adjust, although with a modest drag on growth.
What are the long-term implications for Iran’s nuclear ambitions?
Williams How far back Israel has set Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons largely depends on how much damage it has inflicted on Iran’s hardened underground sites. Often lost in discussions about Iran’s nuclear capabilities is the difference between enriching uranium and building a nuclear bomb. Iran needed only weeks to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels; however, the U.S. Intelligence Community has assessed for decades that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon and still needed to conduct weaponization research to do so. There is no evidence Iran was on the brink of nuclear weapons, and the IC assessed that Iran was not currently undertaking key nuclear weapons–development activities. We should assume Iran is now likely to reverse that decision and actively pursue a nuclear bomb.
Cohen It’s probably too early to say at this point. Ultimately, any strike in and of itself only delays—rather than permanently stops—Iran’s nuclear program. I think it is important to judge these strikes against the counterfactual, though—what would have happened if the world let Iran have a bomb—and I think it’s a real possibility that that would trigger a nuclear cascade through a number of other actors in the region. So net, I think the strikes are probably a positive for counterproliferation efforts.
Grisé It is likely that the Israeli strikes and escalating conflict will incentivize Iran to double down on achieving a nuclear-weapons capability. Key Iranian nuclear facilities have been degraded, and Iranian nuclear scientists have been targeted, but its underground nuclear sites will be more difficult for Israel to destroy, and Iran still retains significant nuclear expertise.
Julia Masterson As a threshold nuclear state, Iran has maintained an advanced civilian nuclear program for decades but has historically moderated its nuclear ambitions to avoid international backlash and secure economic relief. Israel’s strikes against Iran could alter its strategic calculus and prompt it to pursue nuclear weapons despite the associated risks, or at the very least, to reconsider its commitments to the nonproliferation regime as Iranian leadership evaluates its next steps. It is difficult to imagine Iran agreeing to additional restrictions on its nuclear program during this time.
More About This Commentary, Published courtesy of RAND.
Raphael S. Cohen is director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE, director of the National Security Program at the RAND School of Public Policy, professor of policy analysis at the RAND School, and a senior political scientist at RAND. He works on a broad range of defense and foreign policy issues, including defense strategy and force planning, Middle East and European security, and civil-military relations.
Heather Williams is associate director of the International Security and Defense Policy Program within the National Security Research Division at RAND, where she is also a senior policy researcher at RAND, and a professor at the RAND School of Public Policy.
Michelle Grisé is a senior policy researcher at RAND and a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy. Her research portfolio includes work on Russian military strategy and foreign policy, Iran, South Asia, homeland defense, and international law.
Howard J. Shatz is a senior economist at RAND and a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy. He specializes in international economics, including international development, and economics and national security.
Karen Sudkamp is associate director of the Infrastructure, Immigration, and Security Operations Program, part of the RAND Homeland Security Research Division, a management scientist at RAND, and a professor at RAND School of Public Policy.
Marzia Giambertoni is a policy analyst at RAND. Her research portfolio encompasses a range of international security and defense challenges, transnational threat networks, the impact of emerging technologies on strategic competition, and space security cooperation.
Julia Masterson is a defense analyst at RAND. Her research interests include nuclear arms control and deterrence, international diplomacy, and Iran.
