The flag of Mexico flying at United Nations headquarters in new York (via UN Photo)
In the span of less than two months, the United States, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, used force to change the leadership in Venezuela and Iran, disregarding the fundamental principles of the rules-based order. In both countries, force was privileged over dialogue as the instrument for settling disputes and the territorial integrity and political independence of two sovereign States were violated. These actions have normalized leadership decapitation outside multilateral authorization and the resort to force long before peaceful avenues are fully exhausted, driving a rapid and conspicuous erosion of the international system’s foundational rules and safeguards.
Against this backdrop of norm unraveling, claims of the postwar order’s collapse are gaining new traction. Few voices have articulated that conclusion more bluntly than Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. In his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos this January, Carney declared that the rules-based international system had fractured beyond repair, urging States to abandon the illusion of being able to save it and instead confront a world governed by raw power and strategic self-interest. The message resonated, earning a standing ovation by giving voice to the pervasive unease that has defined the past year. Carney called on middle powers to align with one another in navigating this new landscape, pooling influence to maximize leverage in an increasingly transactional world.
Yet his invitation also carried an opportunistic undertone that many overlooked. Beneath the language of pragmatism and cooperation laid an implicit call for States to extract advantage from disruption according to their relative power and interests. That position may be easy to advance for Canada, where education, energy, critical minerals, capital, infrastructure, and investment are abundant. But it disregards the vast diversity among middle powers and risks marginalizing smaller States altogether. Sacrificing inclusiveness and universal solidarity in favor of fragmented, selective cooperation cannot be the answer to systemic turbulence.
Carney’s narrative was also overly simplistic. Declaring the rules-based international order dead sidesteps the harder question of how to reconstruct it so that it is stronger, and more resilient and credible than before. Dismissing today’s system is a convenient exit for those best positioned to weather disorder. Anarchical behavior should not be met with more anarchy, but with an unprecedented defense of the rules that constrain the spread of chaos and limit its appeal.
There is a reason why small States and middle powers have tirelessly insisted on international norms and worked steadily to strengthen international law. It is, quite simply, the most reliable armor these States can wield against arbitrary exercises of power in the international arena. Precisely for that reason, moments of strain are when the rules-based order must be invoked most resolutely. Imperfect though it may be, the cost of abandoning it would be far greater than the cost of reinforcing it.
Carney’s portrayal of the postwar order and its normative pillars as little more than an illusion is also only partially accurate. The multilateral institutions that underpin that order have demonstrated their value as mechanisms for holding States accountable and as deterrents that shape their behavior. Despite the turbulence of recent years, institutions such as the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the World Trade Organization, endure. Their wheels keep turning even under the system’s most blatant breaches, because States recognize that dismantling this system would be both a profoundly irrational response to rogue behavior and a perilous gamble.
This is where multilateral powers assume a decisive role. These are States with deep diplomatic skills and a demonstrated capacity to shape outcomes in multilateral fora in defense of a rules-based order. At the margin of geopolitical headlines, multilateral powers play a quieter and more sustained game, consistently putting forward initiatives and leveraging influence to advance international law. They include States such as Brazil, Indonesia, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, and South Africa. These States should be the first to respectfully decline Carney’s invitation to find advantage in disorder where they can. They carry a distinct responsibility to demonstrate that adaptation to a multipolar world and commitment to multilateralism are not mutually exclusive, as he suggests, but mutually reinforcing and ultimately in the collective interest. At a time when there is an overemphasis on power politics in international relations commentary, it is important to shed light on other components beyond geopolitical muscle that contribute to the fortitude of the international system.
Multilateralism vs Multipolarity?
Carney cited Finnish President Alexander Stubb’s recently coined term “values-based realism” as the compass for the new Canadian approach. It calls for a commitment to universal values while acknowledging that others may not share them, thereby allowing for greater pragmatism in international relations. Yet Carney’s vision to materialize “values-based realism” resembles the very world Stubb cautioned against: one in which multilateralism yields to a multipolar order, where a fluid array of alliances based on States’ self-interest governs global cooperation.
Even so, many States of the Global South would likely find it amusing to hear strategic autonomy described as novel. Since the turn of the century there has been steady diffusion of power, meaning influence is no longer concentrated in a handful of States but dispersed along regional powers, emerging economies, and increasingly diverse coalitions. States in the Global South have become experts at navigating this terrain, loosening alliances to the extent possible and progressively assessing cooperation case-by-case. Jorge Heine, a former Chilean ambassador, describes this strategy as active nonalignment, where States refuse to associate rigidly with any single bloc to preserve room for economic and political maneuver, enhance strategic leverage, and maximize opportunities across the geopolitical board. In a 2025 article, Heine reveals that at least 101 countries currently follow such a path. Their experience shows that strategic autonomy need not come at the expense of multilateral institutions or the rules they sustain. The two are parallel, complementary, and interdependent tracks that can and must be advanced in tandem. On this front, the Global South offers lessons the Global North would do well to heed.
The Finnish president’s framing of multilateralism and multipolarity as at odds with each other does not reflect this reality. Multilateral powers must push back against the notion that more diversified and flexible partnerships are incompatible with a rules-based system. For most small and medium-sized States, such arrangements are a rational and necessary response to a shuffling multipolar order. And precisely because these relationships are more fluid, reliance on international law and multilateralism becomes more, not less, essential. Clear rules and shared norms provide predictability, protect weaker actors, and uphold human rights, which are considerations that only grow in importance as interstate interactions expand. The relationship between multilateralism and multipolarity thus carries far greater gravity than tension, and that gravity must be pursued and asserted to prevent disarray.
An Order Between Collapse and Reinvention
The question then turns to the resilience of the institutions that sustain the world order and how they might adapt to new power dynamics. At Davos, Carney seemed to disregard how crucial these institutions still are today, while Finland’s Stubb has argued they will either collapse in the coming decade or be restructured to reflect new balances of power. A more realistic assessment, however, lies somewhere between these extremes.
Outright collapse remains unlikely given the unprecedented scale, reach, and interconnectedness of the current international system, which has also proven successful in preventing direct great-power conflict for eight decades. The global institutional architecture is deeply embedded in modern life. International standards and agreements quietly govern everything from aviation safety and telecommunications to postal exchanges, container shipping, and even the colors and symbols that make traffic signals universally understood. This dense web of coordination creates a level of practical interdependence that would be extraordinarily costly and complex to dismantle. Historical analogies that predict systemic collapse therefore overlook how rapidly and extensively the international order was institutionalized after 1945. The result is a modern rules-based system with a degree of structural resilience that has no historical precedents. Yet parts of that system have become irrelevant, underscoring the importance of reviewing institutional performance and sunsetting those that no longer serve their purpose.
At the same time, forecasting a descent to rigid spheres of influence overlooks the diversification of security and economic alignments that now define international relations. Many countries have already chosen distinct primary partners for their security, trade, and investment domains, blurring the traditional factors that allowed predictability in these arrangements: historical ties, geographic proximity, colonial pasts, or value sharing. This fragmentation weakens the coherence that spheres of influence have historically relied upon, making their realization less likely.
Nevertheless, swift structural transformation is equally improbable for now. Although the rhetoric of the United States has increasingly emphasized accountability and efficiency within the United Nations, these demands focus on operational reforms and reprioritizing its scope rather than on redistributing power within it. This landscape makes meaningful structural changes to the U.N.–such as abolishing the Security Council veto, modifying the structure of the Security Council, or introducing mechanisms to suspend States that violate the U.N. Charter–unlikely, since they would almost certainly clash with the worldview of the current U.S. administration. These reforms are incompatible with the transactional order that Washington has sought to advance. Therefore, expecting a genuine redistribution of power toward a more representative international order, as envisioned by Stubb, is unrealistic at the moment.
In this environment, channeling frustration into momentum for repurposed continuity of the existing system is a better bet. Signs of this impetus are already visible. Over the past 18 months, new frameworks on financing for development and cybercrime have been successfully negotiated at the U.N., while groundwork has been laid for global governance on artificial intelligence and a convention on crimes against humanity, to name just a few examples. U.N. member States’ receptiveness to the secretary-general’s UN80 Initiative to identify inefficiencies, review mandate implementation, and examine possible structural and programmatic realignment also signals a growing appetite for renewal. Across these efforts runs a shared recognition that multilateral cooperation is still the best tool to address global challenges, but also that it must evolve with speed and determination if it is to remain relevant.
What Multilateral Powers Must Do
As geopolitical power shifts, multilateral powers are uniquely positioned to exercise strategic influence. Their comparative advantage lies in their capacity to convene coalitions, bridge geopolitical divides, and translate normative aspirations into institutional design. For these States, the changing world order creates an opening to shape the emerging architecture of global governance that will define the next phase of multilateralism.
Multilateral powers will need to act together as much as possible. While their issue-specific positions will vary, it will be crucial for them to unite as staunch upholders of norms and institutions across the board. As Stubb rightly noted, earning the confidence of the global community requires demonstrating consistency over double standards and prioritizing cooperation over domination. But many Western countries’ responses to recent military operations in Venezuela and Iran do little to build confidence in the rules-based order. In both cases, several Western States have failed to condemn violations of international law by Israel and the United States, highlighting their selective application of the law to fit their interests–a pattern that extends to Russia and its supporters in Ukraine for the past four years.
This consistency gap does not go unnoticed by the vast majority of the international community, which yearns to curb the prevalence of hypocrisy in the global arena. Faced with this lack of dependability from great powers, multilateral powers must chart a more impartial and credible course. Their sustained and visible cohesion could have far-reaching effects in dissuading great-power misconduct, emitting constant reminders that respect for rules must, above all, be the bedrock of a renovated multilateralism.
The power of consistency and unity among small and medium-sized States should not be underestimated. Throughout history, the fabric of multilateralism has been built through creative coalitions capable of counterbalancing raw power dynamics. Multilateral institutions themselves are structured in ways that elevate the importance of alliances, where the principle of sovereign equality enhances the value of collective action and offers a pathway toward greater predictability in global affairs. Acting strategically and in concert, multilateral powers can pool their diplomatic capital, amplifying their influence and shaping international agendas in ways that far exceed their individual capacities.
Multilateral powers should also contribute to reform efforts together. They must be the first to recognize the shortcomings of the current structure and abandon more narrow agendas in favor of a leaner, more agile, and efficient multilateralism. They should lead the push for results, moving beyond inertia to restructure mandates, programs and working methods. Simultaneously, they must press for greater urgency in reforms that enhance the system’s representativeness. Some of them, including Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Singapore have already begun to do this through the UN80 Global informal grouping, a diverse coalition of nine countries committed to multilateralism and international law. Expanding this coalition could pave the way for more robust and coordinated reform efforts.
Multilateral powers must also jointly communicate to the United States that they agree with its calls for institutional efficiency and accountability, and that coordinated reform offers a more constructive path than disruptiveness. Collective action can deliver the responsiveness Washington seeks while preserving the stability and legitimacy that only shared institutional frameworks can provide. The United States is not alone in that pursuit, and building on that common ground will be a strategic necessity for improving the system.
In addition, greater involvement of young people in the work of the U.N. will be essential to strengthening its long-term sustainability and legitimacy. A 2025 cross-regional study shows that younger adults are more likely to have a positive opinion of the U.N. than older adults. Yet, the U.N. has struggled to articulate an impactful strategy to generate sustained engagement and buy-in from young people. For example, low participation in youth delegate programs highlights the challenges many member States, particularly in the Global South, encounter in creating and maintaining these programs, primarily due to financial limitations. Even when they attend, outcomes and follow-up lack.
Multilateral powers can help drive strategies to remedy this shortfall, for example, by advocating to institutionalize meaningful outcomes from youth forums and spaces, such as declarations or negotiated documents. This tangible output could enhance participation by attracting more funding from national budgets and a wider variety of sources. That being said, participation in a forum alone is insufficient. Following U.N. engagement, youth delegates and leaders should be provided pathways for sustained involvement across the U.N. system, including through paid internships, the Young Professionals Program, and the Junior Professional Officer Program. Developing this systemic link could help institutionalize youth participation and attract historically underrepresented communities to the U.N., widening the reach and credibility of multilateralism.
Mexico: A Multilateral Power in a Changing World
On Sept. 5, 2025, the U.N. adopted an easy to miss yet significant resolution on the Revitalization of the General Assembly, aimed at strengthening the General Assembly’s impact and improving its working methods. The text contained a notable breakthrough: at Mexico’s initiative, member States called on the Security Council to refrain from blocking actions intended to prevent or halt genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.
This development builds on the 2016 French-Mexican Initiative–a political declaration advocating voluntary restraint of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. It also follows the Code of Conduct proposed by the 27-member Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, which calls on member States to pledge their support for credible, timely, and decisive action by the Security Council in such situations. By enshrining the core of those appeals in a U.N. resolution, backed by the moral and political authority of the entire General Assembly, member States have brought about a new tool for demanding accountability from the Security Council in the face of inaction. The Council’s paralysis on Gaza, Ukraine, and Sudan has fueled frustration across the globe and is one of the main contributors to the erosion of the U.N.’s credibility, effectiveness, and legitimacy.
The Sept. 5 resolution also requests the president of the General Assembly to issue recommendations for action based on the body’s discussions following a Security Council veto. This push was also at Mexico’s initiative. Under Resolution 76/262, the president of the General Assembly must convene an official debate after a veto is cast, allowing all member States to deliberate on the matter. Although this mechanism has amplified the Assembly’s voice on issues of international peace and security, it has so far fallen short in triggering meaningful action. States debate, reflect, and voice their views, but the chapter is closed after a mere summary of the discussion.
Mandating recommendations for follow-up action could change this dynamic. The General Assembly already has pathways for action, such as investigative mechanisms, fact-finding missions, sanctions, deployment of mediators, requests for advisory opinions, establishment of peace operations, or the ability to convene an emergency special session to advance collective measures. However, these mechanisms have historically been slow, underused, or less effective than they could be due to bureaucratic barriers, a lack of clear procedural triggers, or limited political consensus among member States. Thus, what is new and significant is the systematic linkage of these existing tools to the Assembly’s deliberations in the immediate aftermath of a veto. By embedding action-oriented recommendations, post-veto Assembly debates could evolve from being a platform for soft scrutiny to functioning as a bridge toward direct action from the General Assembly. As a result, it may enhance the predictability, impact, and political momentum of the Assembly’s response.
Such a shift could have practical consequences. It could reduce the lag between Security Council deadlock and broader U.N. engagement, ensuring that follow-up measures are considered while political attention is still focused and diplomatic pressure high. It should also change the way in which member States approach discussions after the veto, adopting more proactive mindsets that focus on communicating concrete actions. The value of this provision will ultimately lie in the depth and reach with which member States choose to engage with it. To maximize its potential, both member States and the president of the General Assembly must fully embrace its policymaking nature, centering the debate primarily around further action rather than the excessive repetition of well-known positions regarding veto use, or simply deliberating on the issue at hand with no impact. If well-articulated, the consistent practice of recommending follow-up actions could help normalize the expectation that a veto does not end the multilateral conversation, it simply redirects it.
Mexico is also part of a group of States promoting the full implementation of Article 27 (3) of the U.N. Charter, which has a clause stating that Security Council members shall not vote in decisions under Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) when they are “a party to a dispute.” In the first six years of the U.N., this obligatory abstention rule was invoked eight times, reflecting a clear commitment to the principle that no State should act as a judge in its own cause. However, adherence has waned over time, and the provision has been cited as a basis for abstention only a couple of times in the past 65 years. The initiative thus seeks to adopt a General Assembly resolution that can provide clarity on what the term “party to a dispute” means, setting minimum expectations for when a Security Council member should abstain in a vote under Article 27 (3). This could contribute to unlocking Security Council action to peacefully settle disputes, such as calls for a ceasefire or for the resumption of negotiations between parties, with greater frequency and timeliness.
Multilateralism is a marathon, and shaping global norms and policies requires patience and persistence. The envisioned measures are not going to solve the problem of irresponsible use and abuse of the veto or the U.N.’s structural deficiencies, but they are small steps in the right direction. They empower the General Assembly by maximizing the tools already at its disposal. Reforming the U.N.’s institutional architecture remains challenging, as any change would require approval from the permanent Security Council members whose privileges are most at stake. In this context, creative interpretations that advance the evolution of existing norms are necessary. They offer a way to strengthen the Assembly’s role in maintaining international peace and security without amending the powers and functions defined by the U.N. Charter. Mexico has been a consistent driver of this approach as a pragmatic way to advance international law.
Mexico must continue the initiatives that have long defined its strong multilateral tradition in defense of a rules-based order. For example, together with France, Mexico should relaunch the French-Mexican Initiative on veto restraint with renewed ambition to gain more supporters. Signing on to the declaration could be a straightforward way for governments to demonstrate their commitment to a more humane rules-based order. With the right strategic leverage, the declaration, currently signed by 107 member States, could reach near universality. This could, over time, lay the foundation to consolidate the principle as a customary form of international law.
Mexico’s leadership should also extend to strengthening international law where gaps remain. Its advocacy for a strict Charter-based interpretation of Article 51, which governs the exceptional right to self-defense, is increasingly vital as some States invoke it in ways that depart from the provision’s text, practice, and original purpose. By promoting increased dialogue, clearer parameters, and enhanced reporting obligations, Mexico can help close the gap between legal doctrine and State practice.
Similarly, advancing negotiations on a comprehensive convention on crimes against humanity would close one of the most significant and longstanding gaps in international law. Although genocide and war crimes are addressed under existing treaty regimes, no international instrument currently codifies the full scope of States’ obligations to prevent, investigate, and punish crimes against humanity. Mexico has already led efforts to adopt resolution 79/122, convening a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 2028 and 2029 to develop a legally binding instrument.
These initiatives provide practical paths for multilateral powers striving to move forward amid disorder. They show that multilateralism is a living, evolving framework, with ample room to refine existing tools and progressively strengthen its rules. Taken together, these efforts demonstrate that far from abandoning its normative foundations, the international community can reinvigorate a more robust and resilient rules-based order.
Not Quite the End
The United States taking a step back from the international system is not a new phenomenon. During the interwar period, despite playing a central role in designing multilateral institutions, the United States repeatedly opted for non-participation or withdrawal. It famously refused to join the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice, citing concerns over sovereignty and the risk of entanglement in foreign conflicts. Similarly, the United States delayed joining the International Labor Organization until 1934, withdrew from the Geneva Disarmament Conference when negotiations stalled, and enacted policies such as the Neutrality Acts, which limited engagement in international security matters.
This tendency persisted in the postwar era. The United States has selectively engaged with or outright resisted key international institutions and agreements, including the International Criminal Court, UNESCO, and climate accords such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. These examples illustrate that U.S. retrenchment from global governance has deep historical roots, reflecting a broader pattern of privileging domestic political dynamics and isolationist sentiment over sustained multilateral commitments.
Although breaches of the U.N. Charter must never be normalized, it would be disingenuous to suggest that disruption has not long been part of great powers’ repertoires. From the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the 2003 Iraq War, great powers have repeatedly resorted to direct military action to reshape other States’ political landscapes. These interventions bypassed multilateral authorization, undermined sovereignty, and challenged the very norms the postwar order sought to uphold. The recent operations in Venezuela and Iran thus fit within a historical framework that disrupts international stability and tests multilateral institutions. Such conduct must always be met with unequivocal condemnation and bold action to fill the gaps that allow for its recurrence. This holds especially true in fragile times like these.
Against this background, arguing that the international order and its institutions will crumble following the United States’ retreat is hyperbolic. It will surely generate some degree of instability, as all periods of realignment do, but disruption will also grapple with powerful drivers of continuity and progress. Chief among these are multilateral powers, which are uniquely positioned to ensure those stabilizing forces remain cohesive and resilient. If they do, the end of the world as we know it is not quite here yet.
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Author’s Note: The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Government of Mexico.
– Alicia Buenrostro Massieu, Ander Laresgoiti, Published courtesy of Just Security
